**Abstract**

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) tries to harmonize short-term relief and long-term development through effective political and financial coordinating mechanisms. Within the current EU legislative framework, LRRD is broadly considered in the Humanitarian Aid Instrument, whereas the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) is characterized by a less systematic commitment to LRRD. The Instrument for Stability was designed as a more flexible instrument that also opens up opportunities for LRRD but it is mainly security driven and has failed to convince practitioners of its LRRD value.

The analysis of the actual implementation of the European LRRD concept in different partner countries and crisis situations shows that, despite some progress made in recent years, the funding gap in the grey area between relief and development still exists and the coordination and enhancement of LRRD activities is far from being institutionalised.

In the light of the 2014-2020 MFF and the new DCI, the study gives suggestions regarding the legal basis, financing options and general recommendations for the EU’s strategic framework on LRRD. Amongst others, additional resources are needed for LRRD, which should be seen as an approach rather than an option in geographical instruments and respective provisions should be made explicit in Country Strategy Papers.
This study was requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence Committee on Development.

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# Strengthening LRRD in the EU’s financing instruments

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. **INTRODUCTION**

2. **LRRD IN EXISTING EU LEGISLATION AND STRATEGY**
   2.1 Evolution of the LRRD concept in EU legislation
   2.2 Overview of the instruments currently engaged with LRRD
     - 2.2.1 Instrument for Humanitarian Aid
     - 2.2.2 Development Cooperation Instrument
     - 2.2.3 Instrument for Stability
   2.3 Cotonou Agreement and European Development Fund
   2.4 EU Strategy and Commitment
   2.5 Concluding Remarks

3. **LRRD IN PRACTICE**
   3.1 LRRD coordination and institutions
     - 3.1.1 Analysis of how LRRD functions within the Commission
     - 3.1.2 LRRD in EU Member States and other countries and institutions
     - 3.1.3 Opportunities and Risks of LRRD
     - 3.1.4 Operational challenges
   3.2 LRRD country examples
     - 3.2.1 Haiti: LRRD in Post Disaster Reconstruction
     - 3.2.2 Chad: getting beyond humanitarian aid
     - 3.2.3 Horn of Africa: LRRD and building resilience
     - 3.2.4 Afghanistan: LRRD in conflict zones

4. **THE FUTURE FINANCING OF LRRD ACTIVITIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW PROPOSED DCI**
   4.1 The provisions in the proposed DCI
   4.2 Suggestions for the proposed legal provisions for the DCI
   4.3 Additional suggestions for and beyond the DCI
   4.4 Suggestions concerning the humanitarian aid instrument
   4.5 Suggestions for financing future LRRD activities

5. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

5
BIBLIOGRAPHY 41

ANNEX I: LRRD Survey 45

ANNEX II: LRRD on National and UN Level 49
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study aims to provide an overview of LRRD practice in the current institutional and legislative context of the different EU funding instruments in the light of the new proposed DCI and the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020. LRRD tries to harmonize short-term relief and long-term development through effective political and financial coordinating mechanisms in order to develop complementary and comprehensive approaches for a sustainable response to crisis situations. It is widely acknowledged that LRRD should not be understood as a chronological continuum of humanitarian aid and development cooperation but rather as a parallel approach of complementing instruments and programmes. Disaster Risk Reduction and resilience are also to be seen in the wider context of LRRD.

Within the current EU legislative framework, LRRD is considered in quite broad terms in the Humanitarian Aid Instrument and the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. The latter calls for improved coordination of instruments and close coordination “from the earliest phase of a crisis response” (EU 2008: 77). In the 2012 Commission Staff Working Paper on the Humanitarian aid strategy LRRD is more precisely accounted for. It is important to strengthen the link between humanitarian aid and development cooperation in order to provide a basis for targeted and more flexible aid in situations of fragility. However, the DCI and the Consensus on Development are characterized by a somewhat loose commitment to LRRD. Addressing fragility is not articulated as a primary objective and the related connections to transition strategies and linkages between humanitarian aid and development cooperation are limited. The Instrument for Stability was designed as a more flexible instrument that also offers opportunities for LRRD but it is mainly security driven and has failed to convince practitioners of its LRRD value. The risk in this instrument remains, that LRRD is undermined by the mainstreaming of EU foreign policies and the EEAS security-development nexus. Despite legal provisions, communications and strategies on LRRD, implementation seems to rely very much on individual willingness and informal coordination. The concept needs to be institutionalised in such a way that EU staff and delegations see LRRD as an overall approach rather than an option in crisis situations. Also, existing definitions and agreements on “LRRD” should be supported, but not substituted, by new terminology such as “resilience”.

Even though the need for flexibility and comprehensiveness in financing LRRD activities has been acknowledged in various EU communications and instruments, most of the Commission’s non-humanitarian funding mechanisms have not demonstrated much flexibility and speed. Development funding instruments such as the DCI’s thematic programmes (FSTP) as well as the programmes available to NGOs have long and complex procedures. In many complex emergencies the humanitarian phase carried out by DG ECHO has to be stretched to beyond the strictly emergency phases.

The LRRD inter-service group has been installed to coordinate the different instruments of the Commission but has not proven to be very functional on an operational level, as the country cases exemplify. Ad hoc crisis management tools (such as the Haiti Task Force set up after the earthquake) have created competition and power struggles between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) are designed at the delegation level and the strengthened position of Delegations theoretically opens new funding opportunities for LRRD. It appears that the difficulty to implement the LRRD concept also derives from a lack of internal coordination at the programming stage. On top of that, LRRD implementation very much depends on good cooperation and coordination with EU member states and other national stakeholders, UN agencies and civil society organisations.

The analysis of the actual implementation of the European LRRD concept in different partner countries and crisis situations shows that, despite some progress made in recent years, the funding gap in the grey
area between relief and development still exists and the coordination and enhancement of LRRD activities is far from being institutionalised. In the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, advocacy work and funding opportunities for reconstruction was provided by ECHO, but for the continuity of funding in the transition period effective mechanisms are still needed. In Chad, the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) in combination with on-going development programmes creates a complex crisis. The Horn of Africa, with recurrent conflicts, droughts and floods, is also in need of comprehensive LRRD action that takes food security and disaster preparedness into account. The “Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience” (SHARE) initiative and other programmes have made positive contributions, but close coordination between the various humanitarian and development assistance tools still needs to be improved. The EU’s engagement in Afghanistan is very complicated and shows the difficulty to uphold basic humanitarian principles while cooperating with national authorities in a conflict stricken country. The military strategy has undermined the space for civilian aid actors and disaster preparedness has not been a high priority.

Concerning the new proposed DCI, strong possibilities for increased flexibility in funding instruments in thematic and geographical programmes can be found in article 10. More explicit emphasis on LRRD is placed in article 12, which includes support for the transition from emergency situations to the development phase. In the light of the 2014-2020 MFF and the new DCI, the study gives suggestions regarding the legal basis, financing options and general recommendations for the EU’s strategic framework on LRRD:

- LRRD should be seen as an approach rather than just a programming option and should be mainstreamed in the programming of humanitarian aid and development cooperation programmes in conflict stricken regions. Therefore, capacity building and training is needed, both in EU institutions and on the ground. Also, the establishment of LRRD “focal points” within EU Delegations could help promoting the topic.
- Furthermore, the programming process (of National/ Multiannual/ Regional Indicative Programmes and, if existent, in the templates for Country Strategy Papers) should include stock taking of LRRD, risk assessment and support measures with indicators and expected results that would also allow for adaptation of programming for emergency situations, if required. In the transition period there especially needs to be a clear mandate and engagement of the DCI in order to ensure resilience and recovery.
- Concerning the Humanitarian Aid Instrument, a common strategic framework for coordination and exchange of information with geographical development instruments and with DEVCO should be defined, also considering exit strategies and realistic timeframes of interventions.
- The main source of funding for LRRD actions should come from the geographical development cooperation instruments (EDF, DCI, ENPI, IPA) and LRRD should be mainstreamed in country programming and longer term cooperation. Detailed provisions have to be defined (sector definition, country constraints in the analysis of National Development Plans) in order to assure that flexible responses are linked with predictable longer term programmes.
- The study does not suggest establishing a specific LRRD fund since coordination and transaction costs would increase. However, additional resources for the overall budget for external actions are needed for LRRD to be pursued more strongly from humanitarian aid and development cooperation instruments. Innovative financial tools such as a “crisis-modifier” or a reserve that derives from development funding for a specific country could be considered.
**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGIR</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Sahel Initiative</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid)</td>
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<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection</td>
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<td>DIPECHO</td>
<td>Disaster Preparedness ECHO</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FCA</td>
<td>Forgotten Crises Assessment</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Framework Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>FSTP</td>
<td>Food Security Thematic Programme</td>
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<td>GHDI</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative</td>
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<td>GNA</td>
<td>Global Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>HIP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IHA</td>
<td>Instrument for Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for pre-accession assistance</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multiannual Financial Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Multiannual Indicative Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Programme d’Accompagnement à la Stabilisation (Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCNA</td>
<td>Post Conflict Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>PDNA</td>
<td>Post Disaster Needs Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHARE</td>
<td>Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td>TISG</td>
<td>Transition Interservice Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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1. **INTRODUCTION**

The need to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in situations of fragility and crises is broadly accepted by scholars and practitioners alike and the European Commission as well as the European Parliament have repeatedly emphasized the need to address humanitarian aid and long-term development in a coordinated and complementary manner. Against the background of the new European financial framework (MFF 2014-2020) and the new Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), this study examines existing institutional and legislative structures regarding LRRD, assesses obstacles encountered in implementation and gives suggestions on how respective provisions on LRRD can be improved.

Depending on context and dimension of a crisis, the grey zone between humanitarian aid and development differs in intensity and extension. Crisis situations include minor floods that hit small areas of a country only and leave infrastructure intact as well as major conflicts leading to droughts, famine and mass-migration across countries and regions. Natural disasters have been a major driver of humanitarian aid in recent years (GHA 2011: 54) and are increasing due to climate change. Many disaster prone countries are located in the vicinity of the equator and suffer from economic shortcomings and political instability. Complex emergencies often include a seesaw of humanitarian crisis and development work, leading to reversal of development gains and unstable strategies. E.g. development work with host communities can be lost due to the impact of an incoming displaced community. Decision making is always affected by a mixture of long term and short term factors.

The LRRD concept has been introduced in the European debate in the 1996 and 2001 EC Communications on LRRD (COM(96) 153, COM(2001) 153) and was included in a number of EU strategy papers and legal texts since, including the Cotonou agreement and the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. The actual implementation of the LRRD concept is rather complex and involves a number of different stakeholders, both on EU and country level, financial instruments and coordinating efforts in terms of mandates, objectives, financing, timeframe and working methodologies. At institutional, political and financial levels, responsibilities for humanitarian aid and development cooperation are clearly separated. Development programmes are usually run in cooperation with governments, whereas humanitarian aid is primarily channelled through NGOs or international organisations. However, LRRD touches both sides and takes place in between, so it requires coordination and communication.

After briefly describing the evolution of the LRRD concept, the study at hand analyses existing EU instruments that can be used for LRRD activities, i.e. the Humanitarian Aid Instrument, DCI and IfS, in respect of their legal provisions on the subject. Thereafter, EU communications and strategy papers are analysed and the commitment of the different EU institutions towards LRRD as well as hindrances and risks of the EU LRRD concept within the 2007-2013 MFF structure are discussed (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 then elaborates on how LRRD is implemented in practice, also by giving a number of case studies. From this evidence, Chapter 4 examines the proposal for the new DCI in respect of LRRD, also in relation to other instruments, and gives recommendations for future financing and policy options of LRRD.

The findings of this study are based on a thorough analysis of existing EU regulations and publications on LRRD, on case studies of LRRD implementation on the ground, on qualitative interviews with EU representatives and NGOs as well as on a quantitative survey among implementing agencies. The latter, which is composed of 15 multiple choice questions plus optional additional comments, was distributed through partner organisation lists of ECHO and VOICE and had a relatively high return of 50 participants (cf. Annex I).
2. **LRRD IN EXISTING EU LEGISLATION AND STRATEGY**

The following chapter begins with an analysis of the evolution of the LRRD concept. The study then provides an overview of LRRD practice in the current institutional and legislative context of the different EU funding instruments (Humanitarian Aid Instrument, DCI, Instrument for Stability) and of the EU policy strategy as outlined in communications, reports and strategy papers. Finally the chapter concludes with a better understanding on how LRRD is put into practice and what possible deficiencies should be addressed in the EU legislation.

2.1 **Evolution of the LRRD concept in EU legislation**

The European Commission (EC) introduced the concept of LRRD in its 1996 communication to the Council and the European Parliament (COM (96) 153). The Communication demonstrated the necessity to conceptually link relief, rehabilitation and development through complementarity, coherence and efficiency in EU external and development policies. When addressing violent conflicts, natural disasters and other catastrophes, the reciprocal benefits of smoothly coordinating rapid humanitarian intervention and sustainable development are emphasised. Although the communication places value on the holistic approach of LRRD, the agenda-setting catchword is “continuum” – underlining the chronological interlocking of relief, rehabilitation and development. Coordination and division of labour and responsibility are to be achieved by phasing in one stage of the continuum and phasing out another, using rehabilitation as the bridge between relief and development (EC 1996: 9).

Today “the understanding of what LRRD means has shifted. The assistance continuum, dominated by hand-over thinking, has given way to the contiguum, which calls for simultaneity and complementarity of different aid instruments to increase their effectiveness” (Koddenbrock / Büttner 2009: 117). This is also reflected in the more recent EC communication from 2001 (COM (2001) 153), which comes to the conclusion that the complementarity of LRRD activities evolves in a more complex manner. Within one crisis-stricken country, different instruments might be suitable at the same time – only in different areas. Relief programmes need to consider long-term consequences of intervention whilst at the same time stability and development can be significant for conflict prevention. Therefore, the overall political, economic and social context of crises should be considered more closely, especially in conflict situations (EC 2001: 22). The interdependency of humanitarian and development related activities is translated into demands of higher flexibility, readiness to assume risk and decentralisation of decision-making structures as well as better quality analysis of the evolving situation.

The concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development started off as a UN initiative in the 1980s, when cases of natural disasters and violent conflicts increased, especially on the African continent, and a new understanding evolved that recognised that systemic factors, poverty and political instability actually constitute and increase the vulnerability towards natural disasters as well as in protracted crisis situations. The basic idea of LRRD is to link short-term live-saving measures with long-term development efforts in order to make use of positive synergies and to avoid counterproductive outcomes. The priority given to LRRD has varied over the years, and there has been less interest in the concept in recent times. One reason for the lack of continuity in the LRRD agenda is the fundamental challenge of linking stakeholders from different sectors, i.e. humanitarian aid and development cooperation, together, as they generally start from different founding principles and with different motivations. At the European level this divide is also reflected in the institutional setting, where DG ECHO was founded in 1992 to coordinate direct humanitarian aid with little to no relation with respective national governments, while DG DEVCO is responsible for long term development assistance, also engaging with national governments and establishing political dialogue.
While there might be good reasons for such an institutional divide, the multiple vulnerabilities of many poor and the underlying (often systemic factors) such as climate change, political crises or frequent economic shocks call for a combined and coordinated humanitarian and development intervention (Macrae 2012: 9) and thus for linking relief and development activities.

2.2 Overview of the instruments currently engaged with LRRD

2.2.1 Instrument for Humanitarian Aid

The Council Regulation No 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid (Instrument for Humanitarian Aid / IHA) was adopted in 1996 and is (including a number of amending acts) still the financing instrument for humanitarian aid interventions. Basically, the IHA constitutes the budgetary and procedural regulation for DG ECHO.

The regulation stresses that humanitarian assistance can be regarded as a prerequisite for reconstruction and development and should therefore also target self-sufficiency, preventative actions and preparedness. LRRD as such, is not mentioned in the regulation, but certain paragraphs point in this direction: Humanitarian aid is supposed to include short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction work in close association with local structures and “help those affected regain a minimum level of self-sufficiency, taking long-term development objectives into account where possible” (EU 1996: Art 2d).

Also, coordination among donor countries and humanitarian organisations is emphasized. The Commission “may take any measure necessary to promote close coordination between its own activities and those of the Member States, both at decision-making level and on the ground” including a system for exchange of information (EU 1996: Art 10).

In order to avoid arbitrariness and to minimize the political connotation of humanitarian aid allocations, the Global Needs Assessment (GNA) identifies most vulnerable countries and countries that are in a humanitarian crisis situation. Also, the Forgotten Crises Assessment (FCA) tries to identify underfinanced humanitarian crisis situations (Versluys 2008: 107). Furthermore, the methodologies of post-conflict and post-disaster needs assessments (PDNA and PCNA) are utilised and promoted also within LRRD frameworks. These tools, which seem to have a closer connection to IfS than to IHA, are used in trilateral cooperation with the UN and the World Bank.

The EU (i.e. DG ECHO) does not implement relief measures itself but funds international organisations, such as the Red Cross, UN institutions and International NGOs to realize humanitarian operations in coordination with DG ECHO field offices and EU delegations. Eligible implementing agencies need to sign a framework partnership agreement (FPA) in order to ensure EU guidelines and strategies. Within the current FPA (2008–2012), the Commission emphasizes regular exchange of information (FPA 2009: Art. 3.3), asks humanitarian organisations to link relief, rehabilitation and development and to take “long term development objectives into account, whenever possible” (FPA 2009: Art. 8.3 d). For budgeting humanitarian interventions, DG ECHO also has access to the Emergency aid reserve. IHA financing addresses either short-term measures of emergency relief and reconstruction (up to six months) or “improvements in its implementation” such as feasibility studies, evaluation, coordination and awareness. In the latter lies a certain opening for LRRD since respective linkages strongly rely on good communication and coordination.

2.2.2 Development Cooperation Instrument

The current Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), Regulation no 1905/2006, covers the period 2007 – 2013 and replaces a number of thematic and geographical instruments. Therefore, it is more complex and comprehensive than the IHA or Instrument for Stability (IfS).
The DCI in its section on geographical strategy papers (EU 2006a: Article 19) gives provisions on including transition strategies from post-conflict situations to long-term cooperation. Multiannual indicative programmes for partner countries that are affected by a crisis are supposed to emphasize coordination between relief, rehabilitation and development; equally “regions regularly subject to natural disasters shall provide for disaster preparedness”. At the same time, duplications and inconsistency with “measures eligible for funding under other Community instruments” shall be avoided (EU 2006a: Article 19/6). Under the DCI the Commission provides so-called “special measures” for unforeseen needs related to a crisis that cannot be covered by either the IHA or IfS (EU 2006a: Article 23/1). LRRD specific regulations are also to be found under Article 15, on which the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) is based. Food security measures can be seen in the wider context of LRRD to address vulnerability as well as state fragility.

Overall, concrete provisions on LRRD are rather limited. Addressing fragility is not articulated as a primary objective and the related connections to transition strategies and linkages between humanitarian aid and development cooperation could have been explained more clearly. In its proposal for a new DCI the Commission states that “in the present DCI Regulation, the provisions on fragile states and countries in post-crisis situations are insufficient” (EC 2011f: 4). It is also concluded that transition challenges require a more coherent strategy.

These objectives have been addressed in recent years in the course of the New Deal approach and the EU mainstreaming process of conflict and fragility “across all areas of EU external action”1. This, however, is also due to the new institutional setting after the Lisbon Treaty featuring a prominent position of EEAS and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Within DG DEVCO, the Unit A5 was launched for Fragility and Crisis Management. It coordinates with DG ECHO, EEAS and other relevant Commission services to “ensure coherence between the instruments and with EU policies” (DEVCO 2011: 24), especially in regard to fragility and crisis situations which includes prevention, preparedness, recovery and “transition” – a term frequently used for LRRD. The Unit also co-chairs the Transition Interservice Group (TISG) with DG ECHO (cf. Box 1). However, the mandate of Unit A5 includes a number of further responsibilities and is not restricted to the DCI.2

**Box 1: Mandate of Unit A5 / DG DEVCO**

- to coordinate geographical and thematic DEVCO directorates as well as with other relevant Commission services and the EEAS; to develop and apply harmonised approaches and ensure coherence between the instruments and with EU policies;
- to develop guidance and tools to effectively address situations of crisis and fragility through external aid, keeping state-building as the central objective;
- to act as a focal point in DEVCO on actions and interventions in countries in situation of fragility or crisis and facilitate coordination with ECHO, FPI, EEAS, the UN System and continental and regional bodies (AUC, etc) with the collaboration of all other Directorates/Units concerned;
- to provide support when necessary to EU Delegations dealing with situations of major crisis and fragility, in coordination with geographical and thematic directorates and the EEAS;
- to act as a focal point and network with internal and external stakeholders concerned by the situation of fragility or crisis to better organise Prevention and Preparedness strategies as well as Response and Recovery, including Transition (LRRD);
- to coordinate the update of the list of countries under crisis situation for the purposes of the Financial Regulation and its Implementing Rules;
- to co-chair (with ECHO) the Interservice Group on Transition (former LRRD) and participate in ISG

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and task forces relevant for crisis management.
- to make sure that the overall policies on fragility and crisis management connect with the Disaster Risk Reduction managed by Unit C2.


2.2.3 Instrument for Stability

The Instrument for Stability (IfS), regulation no 1717/2006, replaced the EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and addresses several global security and development challenges. It allows for a) short term crisis response and preparedness (managed by EEAS) and b) long term interventions concerning proliferation; capacity-building to respond to terrorism, crime and trafficking; and enhancing pre- and post-crisis preparedness capacity building (managed by EEAS and DEVCO)\(^3\). The IfS is a horizontal instrument that has a global coverage and its funding is managed by the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) Service, a Commission office. According to the IfS strategy paper 2007-2011, measures are primarily focusing on the pre-crisis - and post-crisis early recovery phase “as opposed to the more immediate humanitarian relief”\(^4\).

The regulation stresses that post-crisis situations require flexible engagement “on the basis of integrated transition strategies” and refers to the EP resolutions on LRRD. Financing instruments are needed that can work “in a manner complementary to humanitarian aid and long-term cooperation instruments” (EU 2006b: 1/2). Within the regulation, LRRD specific actions are provided for under Article 4.3, pre- and post-crisis capacity building that define support for early warning and training, recovery, transfer of know-how and information as well as for implementation of UN Peacebuilding Commission recommendations. Assistance is given to measures in the context of “exceptional and unforeseen situations” that depend on “rapid or flexible implementation” (EU 2006b: Article 6). The duration of such measures is limited to 18 months but might be extended by a further six months.

According to the IfS 2011 annual report, in its first four years the Instrument allocated “€ 482 million to 154 actions worldwide in response to short-term crisis situations” (EC 2011h: 133). These include a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment in Haiti, a post-conflict recovery package in Pakistan, contributions to “tackle the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia” and others (ibid.). Within its long-term component, the IfS was used to address global and regional trans-border challenges (Sahel region, Middle East, southeast Asia amongst others), e.g. through training centres, capacity-building and fact-finding missions (EC 2011h: 134).

The IfS is according to its regulation the most flexible instrument. The regulation allows for financing of operations related to humanitarian disasters and natural catastrophes – although, the instrument is distinct from the IHA as it specifically does not include activities covered by the regulation 1257/96 (EU 2006b: Article 11.3). It is in principle flexible enough to function as a bridge between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, thus potentially filling the funding gap and playing a crucial role in the EU’s LRRD approach. Interview-partners from EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO see the IfS in such a way; however, civil society practitioners are more critical and do not experience this flexibility, especially not for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Thereafter, it is theoretically designed for LRRD but rarely used for it. According to a multiple choice survey among implementing organisations, the commitment of EEAS to LRRD is very unclear\(^5\). If IfS is an LRRD-instrument, this is puzzling since EEAS is mainly in charge of this instrument. In practice, the IfS tends to focus on security issues and conflict situations. Its Thematic

\(^1\) cf. [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm)
\(^3\) Only 10 of 45 respondents agree that EEAS is committed to LRRD, with 15 respondents not being able to answer this question (Annex I q. 3).
Policy Department DG External Policies

Strategy Paper (2012-2013) notably stresses the “nexus between security and development”. Proliferation and efforts to address terrorism and organised crime are major objectives of the IfS that are not linked to LRRD as such, unless somewhat tenuously. If the IfS is supposed to be the bridge for funding gaps in LRRD settings it would need to ensure distance from these other priorities in order to ensure, that humanitarian aid and development cooperation are not dominated by security concerns of the Union.

2.3 Cotonou Agreement and European Development Fund

The 2010 revised Cotonou Agreement is supposed to improve coordination and harmonisation of development strategies and also includes legal provisions on LRRD. Its main instrument for providing assistance is the European Development Fund (EDF). At regional level the so called B-envelope of the EDF allows for financing measures undertaken to respond to humanitarian, emergency and post emergency situations. This mechanism is meant to address flexibility and efficiency and, as a matter of fact, has been used in a number of cases for funding LRRD programmes (Koddenbrock/Büttner 2009: 129).

According to the Agreement, post emergency assistance is supposed to link “short-term relief with longer term development programmes”. Coordination with Member States efforts and “accordance with best practice in aid-effectiveness” is requested in this regard (Article 72). Long term instability and fragility are now also covered by a revised definition of what constitutes a crisis. The objectives of disaster risk reduction are newly emphasized under article 72a/4.

Furthermore, the Agreement establishes a system of Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes that are drafted in coordination with partner countries’ governments. National parliaments, non-state actors and local authorities are to participate in the preparation of national and regional development strategies. In practice, the level of participation of different actors in this drafting differs. CSOs, local governments and parliamentarians are often left out of much of the discussions (32 out of 45 respondents somewhat disagree or fully disagree that local stakeholders are sufficiently involved in decision making / Annex I q. 13). If the drafting is made inclusive, Strategy Papers (CSPs also expire in 2013) provide a chance to agree upon preventive measures and LRRD regulations in case of a crisis, especially in disaster prone regions. Development strategies should have certain flexibility in this regard and provide regulations on how to adapt to a sudden change in the situation.

2.4 EU strategy and commitment

On top of the 1996 and 2001 EC Communication on LRRD (chapter 2.1), the EU has published quite a few consensus and strategy papers with explicit or implicit provisions on LRRD. Even though these documents only indirectly influence the practical implementation of LRRD, they are important benchmarks for the political commitment of EU institutions to pursue the LRRD approach.

European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid

The Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2008/C 25/01) was jointly declared by the Council, the EP and the Commission in 2007. LRRD is included as a basic principle and example of good practice in the relationship of humanitarian aid to other policies: “EU humanitarian aid, including early recovery, should take long-term development objectives into account where possible, and is closely linked to development cooperation” (EU 2008: 22).

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Relevant instruments are required to improve their cooperation, seeking for close coordination “from the earliest phase of a crisis response”. Mutual awareness and innovative transition strategies are expected (EU 2008: 77). The approach is supposed to target synergies while at the same time the “distinct objectives” of humanitarian aid and development aid should be respected (EU 2008: 78). This constitutes a potential flaw, since synergies call for common objectives (Koddenbrock/Büttner 2009: 127), which should be the basis for the LRRD window of opportunity.

Interestingly, the 2011 EP mid-term review of the action plan of the European Consensus on humanitarian aid concludes that there has been “little practical progress” on LRRD and calls for additional resources as well as enhanced dialogue and coordination among humanitarian and development stakeholders – both on the ground and on EU level (EP 2011: pt 41-44). It seems as if the theoretical outlines of the EU’s commitment to LRRD struggle to actually be implemented on the ground.

**European Consensus on Development**

The 2006 EU Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01) does not place as much emphasis on LRRD as the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, however, the subject is touched upon a couple of times. The EU’s intention is to promote linkages between emergency aid, rehabilitation and long-term development in transition situations, guided by “integrated transition strategies”, aiming at reconstruction, food security and support for displaced persons (EC 2006a: 21). Furthermore, the Commission commits itself to foster “coordination of disaster relief and preparedness” in the context of the UN’s leading role in this regard (EC 2006a: 51) and to increase the resilience of partner countries (EC 2006a: 22). Concerning the link of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Consensus points out that development assistance can be provided in complementarity to humanitarian aid and assistance in crisis prevention (EC 2006a: 26). It seems here as if LRRD is not considered relevant in all development cooperation contexts. Yet this does not seem to reflect the field realities conceptualised through the contiguum strategy.

**Agenda for Change**

The Agenda for Change (COM(2011) 637) does not feature LRRD topics any more prominently than does the Consensus on Development. It is stated that the EU “aims to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian aid and crisis response to long-term development cooperation” (EC 2011a: 11/12). More specifically, development, foreign and security policies should be linked in order to promote peace, state-building, poverty reduction and underlying causes of conflict (ibid.). Recovery and resilience in situations of fragility are to be targeted through international coordination and “proper articulation with humanitarian activities” (EC 2011a: 10). Thereby, national ownership and state-building are central factors. A process of “country-based decision-making” is supposed to ensure flexibility in EU’s disaster response (ibid.).

Security policy and state building issues that are raised within the Agenda are closely correlated with EU foreign programmes and strategies. Concerning LRRD, this leads to the question whether the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, as agreed upon in the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, can be safeguarded. However, commission directorates do not share concerns over conflict of interests in this regard. DG ECHO, DG DEVCO and EEAS have different angles to crisis situations and different focal points need to be recognized although humanitarian aid stays fully independent. Again, the survey among implementing agencies comes to a different conclusion: almost 80 % fully agree or agree to some extent that the three institutions do have conflicts of interest regarding LRRD (Annex I q. 5).

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8 According to interviews held with EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO in Mai 2012.
Other papers

The Humanitarian aid strategy for 2012 elaborates on the subject of LRRD in a very comprehensive manner. It is identified as a policy priority and perceived to remain challenging for humanitarian and development actors. Building resilience and disaster risk reduction are equally addressed as priorities in coordination with development institutions. Within regional and country strategy outlines, if possible, specific situations are put into context with LRRD, including the Sahel, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The Communication towards an EU response to situations of fragility (COM(2007)643) dedicates one chapter to LRRD and states that “Relief, crisis management, reconstruction assistance and long-term development cooperation must be properly linked as part of an integrated approach built on the principle of sustainable development” (EC 2007: 8). Efforts still need to be made, namely updating methods of implementation, flexibility in financing mechanisms and harmonisation of analysis and policies. Furthermore, the establishment of ad hoc Country and Thematic Teams is seen as a means to further develop the LRRD strategy. The EU Action Plan to implement agreed commitments on security, development and fragility was put on hold in 2009, possibly also due to “little institutional enthusiasm”.

LRRD is furthermore highlighted in the 2006 Strategy for food security (COM(2006)21), that intends to ensure food security in transition periods by establishing LRRD country strategies (EC 2006b: 10). In this respect, a standing LRRD inter-service working group within the Commission has been established which today is the TISG. The Strategy concludes that the implementation of the LRRD concept “has been rather disappointing”, especially due to the setup of humanitarian and development instruments (EC 2006b: 15). The March 2010 policies on food security and on humanitarian food assistance (COM 127 and 126) emphasize the need to promote and uphold the LRRD principles by referring to the 2001 LRRD communication and 2007 Humanitarian Aid Consensus.

Another significant paper for the LRRD approach is the EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction in developing countries (COM(2009)84). The Strategy proposes that DRR is supported both through development cooperation and humanitarian aid and should be considered in their respective policies and programming (EC 2009: 3/6), “including better inter-linking of DRR funding from development and humanitarian instruments” (EC 2009: 12).

2.5 Concluding remarks

In its 2001 Communication, the Commission pointed out that LRRD is not limited to ensuring the transition from relief to development (continuum) but that it is also important to reinforce the synergies between development and humanitarian aid instruments, which are often implemented simultaneously (contiguum). Therefore, instruments, coordination between commission services and working methods were supposed to be enhanced. The current institutional and legal structure concerning LRRD strategies relies on the coordination of EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO; their respective instruments include DCI, IfS and IHA (Figure 1).

The instruments offer a number of provisions on LRRD, each with a different focus. The IHA points out the necessity to link short-term measures with development objectives and opts for close coordination and exchange of information, especially on the ground. This LRRD-focus is reflected in the Humanitarian Aid Strategy for 2012 and the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. However, it becomes apparent that theoretic provisions are quite often not adopted in practice.

The 2006 DCI has difficulties to actually see LRRD as a cross-cutting issue as the contiguum model would suggest. The subject is touched in a few paragraphs only and does not connect to a holistic approach of fragility and crisis response. Again, a parallel can be found to the Consensus on Development that assesses LRRD as an option rather than an approach.
Figure 1: EU development and humanitarian aid political structure and instruments

Source: authors’ illustration

The IFS is perceived to be the most flexible instrument, thus providing sufficient possibilities to actually support linkages in transition contexts. Yet, this estimation is questioned by humanitarian NGOs. The instrument has been designed to primarily address European external and security strategies. Apparently, LRRD is seen in a wider EU foreign policy framework that tries to cover humanitarian aid and development cooperation as well as security issues of state fragility. The Agenda for Change has been drafted in the spirit of this approach and this shift is also mirrored in institutional arrangements after the Lisbon Treaty.

Based on our survey, the NGO point of view concerning LRRD comes to the conclusion that the funding gap in the grey zone between relief and development still exists (77% fully agree), that financial instruments are not flexible enough (52% somewhat agree; 34% fully agree) and that tangible changes should be made to the EU’s financial instruments (52% fully agree; 34% somewhat agree) (Annex I q. 6, 7, 9).

In order to ensure that the fundamental idea of LRRD, i.e. to link relief and development for the benefit of vulnerable people in fragile countries and acute crises, is accurately reflected in EU legislation, the following aspects have to be considered:

- Various instruments give attention to LRRD and underline synergies and advantages of linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation. At the same time, they are very distinct from one another and explicitly exclude operations covered by other instruments. Especially the DCI should be more open to address transition action. Country Strategy Papers and indicative programmes should be able to adapt to catastrophes, particularly in disaster-prone regions.

- The actual implementation of LRRD in practice seems to rely very much on individual willingness and informal coordination – despite legal provisions, communications and strategies on LRRD. Efforts should be made to institutionalise LRRD in such a way that EU staff and delegations see LRRD as an overall approach rather than an option in crisis situations.

- LRRD does not primarily address political or security-wise fragility and state-building. “The risk of mainstreaming is that the whole topic of fragility gets lost” 9. Therefore, it should be ensured that LRRD is appreciated as such by EEAS and not used as a tool to overemphasize the security-development nexus and to pursue EU foreign policy and security interests instead (cf. Versluys 2008).

3. LRRD IN PRACTICE

3.1 LRRD coordination and institutions

3.1.1 Analysis of how LRRD functions within the Commission

Alongside purely political questions to do with support for the resolution of crises and state and civil society reconstruction in post-crisis contexts, in the last twenty years the Commission has been faced with the difficulty of the disengagement of DG ECHO and the rapid increase of development budgetary instruments. DG ECHO’s role has varied depending on how it has been interpreted and how responsibilities have been distributed between Commissioners. Having at times been administratively and strategically close to DG Development under the aegis of a single Commissioner, DG ECHO is currently under the aegis of a specialized Commissioner more focused on crisis management.

The importance of LRRD has led to the implementation of several mechanisms which aim to facilitate the transition between humanitarian operations and more classic development operations:

- **The adaptation of humanitarian tools**: DG ECHO has begun to include a chapter on exit strategies and LRRD in all its project documents, such as the Single Form. Its partners therefore have to explain what they will do in their projects to link relief and development.

- **The transfer of the Food Aid budget line from DG DEVCO to DG ECHO**: This took place at the beginning of 2008 and brought a whole new series of opportunities and reflections on LRRD, notably leading to the elaboration of DG ECHO’s Food Aid Policy. This has provided a range of innovative tools which contribute to LRRD in the Food Aid sector (cash transfer programmes, etc.).

- **LRRD inter service group**: Following the two EC Communications (1996 and 2001), which did not have a great deal of effect in practice, and the frequent cases of uncoordinated responses to crises, an LRRD Inter-service group was set up in 2003, in order to facilitate the coordination of the different instruments of the Commission and to regularly bring together representatives of the DGs where budget lines can be used in complementarity to cover fragility and post-crisis contexts. Initially, the plan was that it would produce analyses of concrete case studies and encourage the development of joint situation assessments. In fact, this inter-service group does not appear to be very functional. Joint analysis tools are being put in place but the operational level is much weaker than expected. For their part, ad hoc crisis management tools (such as the Haiti Task Force set up after the earthquake) have created more competition and power struggles between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) and more delays than concrete results. But the Commission has tried to return as quickly as possible to the reinforcement of state institutions through the implementation of National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), which are designed at the delegation level. For the time being, any solution implemented by the Commission has to be in keeping with its policy of decentralizing external services. The greater freedom

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10 The Single form is the contractual document used by DG ECHO and its partners to share information on projects at the design, monitoring and reporting stages.
Strengthening LRRD in the EU’s financing instruments

accorded to Delegations to use different budgetary lines and to use NIPs theoretically opens new funding opportunities for LRRD activities, if DG ECHO manages to engage in discussions with the Delegations about projects.

A great deal of effort has been made by the different services of the Commission, both in Brussels and by the Delegations, to find ways of managing both “continuum” and “contiguum” situations. Assessments by the Inter Service group have regularly confirmed that the obstacles to the implementation of LRRD type actions are often internal to the Commission (over and above the complexity of operational contexts). The difficulty of linking relief and development programmes is essentially the result of procedures which are not conceived to function in a complementary way and a lack of coordination at the programming stage.

As a result of these observations, an LRRD analytical framework has been put in place aiming to improve coordination and methodological coherence in terms of situation analysis and establishing a consolidated and complementary response. This analytical framework is based on three essential steps: analysis of the situation, the evaluation of needs and deciding on the content of responses. The goal of this analysis will be to optimize the use of EU tools, to highlight where they are complementary, and to highlight gaps sufficiently early to be able to rectify them in a timely manner. This is where it will be necessary to distinguish between development tools within the Commission in a more detailed manner. Certain tools allow links to be created quite easily, e.g. the Food Security Thematic Programme, the Water Facility and the Aid for Uprooted People Programme.

3.1.2 LRRD in EU Member States and other countries and institutions

Each Member State has developed strategies and operational methods in LRRD and managing the resolution of crises. With this very varied material, the EC tools have tried to establish some coherence and synergy and EC/Member States Joint Programming has been put in place.

Interaction between Commission mechanisms and those of Member States is essential. The actions of major bilateral operators, such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom provide many opportunities and examples (cf. Annex 2). Meetings with Country Managers take place in the field and regularly in Brussels (COHAF, for example). These exchanges should be systematized both in at-risk situations and in those where post-crisis operations are run. In addition, the joint programming exercise between EC and the Member States remains difficult. In Haiti, for example, it did not lead to many concrete results (cf. 3.2.1).

Within the LRRD context, International Financial Institutions (IFI) play an important role as well (such as World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank etc.). They have developed strategies and tools for managing crises and post-conflict contexts. The Commission needs to coordinate with these as much as possible, both at the Brussels level and in the delegations and one of the first actions was to develop assessment tools such as the Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) and the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)\(^\text{11}\)). The objective of these tools is to contribute to the definition of strategic frameworks for the transition developed with the government and multilateral agencies in order to facilitate both the elaboration of a concerted strategy and obtaining the necessary funds.

The IFIs are present increasingly early in crisis contexts as they have understood that an essential phase of the reconstruction takes place very early on. Though in the past it often took months before IFIs

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\(^{11}\) It should also be noted that the European Commission, via DG RELEX, is very involved with the World Bank and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in improving and using these tools.
arrived in post-crisis contexts, they have begun to arrive in the weeks, or even the days just after a disaster has taken place.

**Field operators:** During emergency phases, the Commission essentially works with states in terms of development aid and with NGOs, the Red Cross and specialised UN agencies, DG ECHO partners, for humanitarian aid.

**National state actors:** The state has a certain number of roles and functions which can be disturbed in the event of a crisis and which can be difficult to re-establish in post-crisis contexts. This includes, for example, a country’s sovereignty over a territory and its ability to impose law and order, its ability to provide a certain number of public services, such as health and education and the means it has at its disposal for administration in the widest sense, particularly to allow the financial system and public expenditure circuits to function. These capacities vary a great deal and are essential in LRRD contexts. DG ECHO is not involved in capacity building for states, though this is one of the essential functions of most EC development programmes.

**The United Nations:** Alongside the political instruments connected to the Security Council and the Secretary-General, several UN agencies are involved in post-crisis contexts. Some of the mechanisms put in place are done so by development agencies who have gradually been obliged to become involved in crisis prevention and post-crisis contexts. Others are carried by relief agencies faced with the challenges of the periods before and after conflicts and the difficulties of rapidly finding relay organisations who can allow them to withdraw (see Annex 2).

**Civil Society Organisations:** The term civil society organisation encompasses organisations of very different mandates, sizes and levels of professionalism both in the North and South: real non-profit organisations, sub-contracting operators carrying out projects and/or providing services, civil society representatives, professional and trade union organisations who should have a certain amount of power to mediate tensions, etc. One of the characteristics of these organisations is theoretically their proximity to the field and local people. In principle this should allow them to establish dialogue with the population and with the local authorities. This comparative advantage can be essential in post-crisis situations: NGOs can and often do play an important role in restoring social and inter-community relations. In a post-conflict context, NGOs present in the field can help to revive cooperation. The European Commission has worked very effectively with certain NGOs in numerous cases in Latin America, in Africa, in Central, Southern and South-East Asia, in the Balkans and in the Caribbean when it has been impossible for states and their administrative mechanisms to conduct programmes.

### 3.1.3 Opportunities and Risks of LRRD

Large-scale disasters require a significant level of resources that can be used both during the emergency relief phase and the reconstruction phase and the EC has often demonstrated its capacity to mobilize such means. Yet, these funds should be used in a flexible way based on how needs and circumstances in the field evolve. Unfortunately, most of non humanitarian funding mechanisms of the EC have not demonstrated much flexibility and speed. Funding instruments like thematic programmes (FSTP or the Water Facility) as well as the programmes available to NGO budgets have long and complex procedures and do not have the necessary flexibility to respond to the challenges of post-crisis contexts. It is important to improve the funding of the post-emergency phase. For the time being, this critical phase is only funded by ad-hoc allocations from the EDF’s B envelope in ACP countries\(^\text{12}\) as seen in Chad (cf. 3.2.2)\(^\text{13}\), or by complex exercises to stretch the humanitarian phase carried out by DG ECHO or by tools

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\(^\text{12}\) The B envelope of the EDF is in part of the country level EDF which is not allocated in the country plan and which can be allocated in due course for LRRD activities. DG ECHO can access it through negotiations with the Delegations.

\(^\text{13}\) Evaluation of the LRRD project in Southern Chad.
with limited capacity (e.g. EEAS’s Instrument of Stability), for instance in Bangladesh after Typhoon Sidr\textsuperscript{14} or after the 2010 Haiti earthquake (cf. 3.2.1). The recent efforts (part of the new EU financial procedures currently under negotiation) to facilitate the reallocation of resources, to adopt flexible procedures\textsuperscript{15} when deemed necessary and to ensure “context adaptation”, are significant steps in the right direction.

For DG ECHO, the general problems of the approach to LRRD are partly financial, partly mandate-based, even though there have been a certain number of successful initiatives which should be followed up. The European humanitarian aid instrument works well in response to acute emergencies (earthquakes in Pakistan and Haiti, cyclones in Vietnam and in the Philippines, military conflicts) and certain protracted crises, such as those which involve population displacement which lasts for an extended period (Chad, Darfur, Myanmar, Bangladesh). It can be effective for putting in place actions over a limited period to build the premises of post-crisis actions. But it is not adapted to managing transitions, nor sometimes even to providing efficient aid in the context of protracted crises or situations of long-term food insecurity. Implementing organisations criticize that DG ECHO funding often cuts short opportunities for more holistic and context-appropriate interventions. DG ECHO did develop new financing tools, such as the Global Plan (cf. 3.2.1)\textsuperscript{16}, to try to respond to the challenges of food insecurity in the Sahel or in Haiti. When Nutrition or Health indicators fall below emergency levels due to the failure of development, as in the shanty towns of numerous countries (Kenya, Philippines, India, Bangladesh) the funding framework of DG ECHO and the working methods of humanitarian organisations are not necessarily the most appropriate. Deficiencies include the short funding timeframe and constraints to engage with state institutions. The humanitarian aid funded by DG ECHO is essentially implemented on the basis of funding which can last between a few months and a little over a year by agencies such as the ICRC, the humanitarian units of large UN organisations and NGOs. It cannot work directly with the states concerned, whose role is nevertheless crucial during LRRD transitions. And it does not allow a secure timeframe, which is also necessary to work effectively in most situations of fragility.

Implementing organisations also point out that in many regions, emergencies and disasters are not to be seen as exceptional but occur repeatedly. Therefore, they need to be accounted for in long term development processes as well, i.e. DG DEVCO should strengthen its LRRD efforts, for example by showing more flexible response and adaptation of contracting procedures. Coordinating mechanisms among DG ECHO, DG DEVCO and EEAS are rated to be ineffective and conflicts of interests among these institutions in relation to LRRD are clearly perceived to exist (Annex I q. 4, 5). As for the on ground implementation, it is stated that fragmented instruments and EU structures make it difficult to apply for – and receive adequate funding (50% somewhat agree, 41% fully agree) and administrative procedures and decision making structures need to be simplified (49% somewhat agree, 49% fully agree) (Annex I q. 8, 12).

But over and above discussions about partnerships and instruments, what has been missing for a long time from the European Union in general and the Commission in particular is the political will to understand and support these complex dynamics of crisis resolution and LRRD in a meaningful manner. Europe is seen as a major donor, which sometimes has complicated procedures, but which does not have a political vision of contexts or any real vision of managing the resolution of crises. Supporting EU member states in their engagement in military led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) for the reconstructions in Afghanistan is contributing to the blurred lines between civilian and military actions and to the increased dangerousness of the context (cf. 3.2.4). In Somalia, the 2009 declaration of the EC Commissioner Karel De Gucht that humanitarian aid is part of the anti-terrorist anti Al Qaeda EU strategy is not very constructive. Therefore, the absence of a clear or announced political agenda can have

\textsuperscript{14} Evaluation of DG ECHO food aid budget line 2008.
\textsuperscript{15} http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/prag/annexes.do?group=A
\textsuperscript{16} Global Plan is a type of DG ECHO funding decisions, established to address issues of chronic crises.
certain advantages, such as not polluting humanitarian agendas with political instrumentalisation. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Action should protect European humanitarian action from any political intrusion, while allowing more strategic reflection in terms of supporting crisis resolution.

**Table 1: Interdependency of LRRD factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Prevention</th>
<th>Preparedness</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Recovery/rehabilitation</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity strengthening</strong></td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working with NGOs or working with governmental institutions (national and local level)</strong></td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXXXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct implementation or delegations of projects’ responsibility</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XXXXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXXXXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time frame</strong></td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Short to mid term</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key elements for sustainability</strong></td>
<td>With limited recurring running costs</td>
<td>With limited recurring running costs</td>
<td>Support coping mechanism and no creation of dependency</td>
<td>Invest in crisis proofing (build back safer)</td>
<td>Social and gender equity, crisis sensitivity, economic and environmental soundness,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative frameworks</strong></td>
<td>Hyogio Framework for action. OECD DAC principles of engagement in fragile states; Busan “new deal”</td>
<td>Hyogio Framework for action</td>
<td>IHL; Humanitarian principles. Principles from the Good Humanitarian Donorship.</td>
<td>OECD DAC principles of engagement in fragile states; Busan “new deal”</td>
<td>OECD DAC Paris principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors own illustration; the more X, the more important is the factor.*

### 3.1.4 Operational challenges

Until LRRD becomes an integral part of a common policy for the humanitarian and development branches of the European Commission, it will continue to be limited to either an extended interpretation of the “humanitarian mandate”, to ad hoc arrangements with thematic tools like the FSTP, the Water Facility or the IFS (on an ad-hoc basis), or, as seemed to have been attempted by ECHO, to the withdrawal of humanitarian aid and a “let’s see what happens” attitude. At this stage, the following issues have been identified:

**Move forward on the articulation of concepts:** The difficulties encountered both in the field and in Brussels show that it is imperative to identify shared concepts on which to base LRRD (before tackling tools and their limits): resilience, DRR and Food Security but also some of the key areas for development, including governance, state institutions capacities, rule of law, etc. It is also necessary to organize the drawing up of shared fundamental objectives for humanitarian and development organisations which could be used for programming exercises. In Chad, the EC Delegation and DG ECHO had to deal with the
deployment of an EU military Force which should have played a role in area security in order to promote
the return of IDP (cf. 3.2.2). Based on a faulty diagnosis, the EUFOR could not deliver the expected
conditions for safe return.

Managing predictable risks: this is the fundamental issue of the pre-crisis phase. In contexts where
there is obvious fragility and the risk of crises, the objective is to try to influence global issues and the
vision of development organisations (agenda for change, future EDF programming, etc.) so that they
take issues of resilience and disaster risk reduction into account before it is too late. The need to
combat food insecurity in protracted crisis contexts or in situations where there is a failure of
development has led DG ECHO to launch several innovative initiatives which create clear links
between development issues and the reduction of vulnerabilities before crises take place: Sahel Plan
(see box 2), Haiti Global Plan, SHARE programme for the prevention of food crises in the Horn of Africa
(cf. 3.2.3).

**Box 2: the Sahel Plans, the AGIR and SHARE initiatives**

The Sahel Plan shows that innovative interpretations by DG ECHO of its mandate can increase the
range of strategy choices at its disposal, with new entry points and exit strategies. Rather than a
specific event, the entry point in the countries of the Sahel (except Niger) is a severe malnutrition rate
amongst children under the age of 5 (GAM) that has been over 10% for more than 10 years. One of the
key features of the Sahel Plan has been to clearly identify an exit strategy (mobilisation of development
actors and support to the elaboration of national policies through DG ECHO partners). The Sahel Plan
underlines the dilemmas created by the failure of development, the appalling situations that result
from them and the capacity of humanitarian instruments to respond to these chronic crises. While the
concrete results obtained by the Sahel Plan are highly commendable, it also highlights the limits of DG
ECHO’s role as a public sector donor with a clear specific legal status\(^{17}\) (unable to make a legally
binding commitment for funding in the mid to long term and limited in the type of partners it can
engage with and the length of projects it can fund). The commission recently decided to go one step
further, and launched the “AGIR” initiative (Alliance Globale pour l’Initiative Résilience) which aims to
bring together the strengths of DG ECHO and DG DEVCO in order to address both the structural
vulnerabilities and ongoing disasters with a simultaneous mobilization of long and short term EC
instruments.\(^{18}\)

The most recently designed SHARE initiative for the strengthening of resilience in the Horn of Africa is
of a comparable vein. Combining multi-sectoral and multi stakeholder actions at the regional, national
and local levels, the SHARE initiative aims at improving the capacity of countries and communities to
face the challenges linked to climate change, poverty and conflicts.

**Resolve the contradictions between the Paris Principles (OECD) and the Stockholm Principles (GHDI):**
The Commission and its different branches are faced with a complex situation due to the
emergence of a range of principles from which emerge major contradictions within state policies. This is
the case, for example, for the tensions between the internationally agreed principles founded in the
Paris Declaration (principles of Alignment, Ownership and Harmonisation) and those of the GHDI, known
as the Stockholm principles, (which place the onus on independence and impartiality, and underline
that harmonization does not necessarily mean homogenization). It is true that a lot of work has been
done on Fragile States, including at the EU level with the Communication of 2007, but fundamental
contradictions remain. In contexts such as Afghanistan, the consequences of the lack of clarity in the

\(^{17}\) EC humanitarian resolution

used normative frameworks are causing a lot of difficulties and are contributing to the danger of the context for the aid agencies (cf. 3.2.4).

**Improving time management:** This is an essential factor of crisis management and LRRD. It has several components:

- **Post-crisis planning:** This concerns preparing for the re-launch of development operations during the conflict phase, or the early phase of a disaster through analysis to be carried out together with humanitarian organisations who are (or will be) present before development organisations. It means identifying key issues for the post-crisis phase as early as possible. The in-country EC delegations, supported by Brussels based ad-hoc task forces, should be on the forefront of the proactive planning. Amongst other things, this allows development organisations to understand the crisis-provoking factors which the crisis has revealed and to take these into account in development planning. This should also allow for proper reallocation of development resources to the reconstruction efforts, including renegotiation of pre-crisis agreements such as country level allocation of EDF resources. This step was largely missed in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake (cf. 3.2.1).

- **The real duration of the grey area:** managing the period between the end of relief programmes (generally flexible and rapid mechanisms) and the launch of reconstruction and development programmes (slower and more cumbersome procedures). The time it takes to process the dossiers of development programmes which are due to take over from relief programmes is always too long, which forces relief organisations to stay longer than they want to or should, given their limited experience and means. It is probably during this phase that existing operations and mechanisms are the most problematic.

**Procedural issues:** This is one of the crucial points to do with the creation or adaptation of tools to facilitate the management of post-crisis and LRRD situations. This should be based on the comparative analysis of existing tools (tools which can be mobilized relatively easily: FSTP, the Water Facility and the B envelope (flexible reserve part of the EDF), and the more hefty tools like the EDF and the DCI). Two procedural issues in particular need to be looked at in detail:

- **Project cycle management:** The project cycle is a process which begins with the identification of a possible intervention and ends with the evaluation of the project once it has ended. This very time-consuming and bureaucratic cycle which often ends up with rigid project processes is not appropriate to post-crisis management, where things move fast. There is a need to find ways to make it shorter and more flexible.

- **Fund allocation mechanisms:** In peaceful periods, calls for proposals and competitive procedures are frequently used by donors, and these are even sometimes presented as good practice. But these procedures take time and time is precious in crisis management situations. How can these procedures be made lighter in post-crisis situations where “fast tracks” are dearly needed?

- **Specific mechanism to allow budget support to fragile states:** Special rules govern the use of this “special form of budget support” called “State building fund”. It aims at enhancing the legitimacy of the State and its services as a buffer to crises.

**Multi-actor coordination issues:** In post-crisis situation, this type of coordination only makes sense if: (a) it leads to the production of preparatory analyses and strategies in case the situation develops into a crisis; (b) it allows joint operations to be proposed involving experienced organisations which can be mobilized rapidly without complex contract procedures; (c) it allows the Commission to take part in operational programmes of the international community; (d) it allows the programmes of different organisations to establish a certain level of complementarity in order to avoid overlapping.
In post-crisis contexts, the dialogue between the different actors involved in LRRD should focus on three questions:

- How is it possible to act quickly in an emergency without creating negative effects in the long term (food dependence, disturbing markets, establishing health-related habits which are negative in the long term, etc.)?

- How can relief be provided effectively while at the same time strengthening the resilience of individuals, families, communities and societies as a whole?

- What can be done with what exists or remains of state apparatus? This might also include considerations of “build back different” or “build back better” for improving certain structures.

At the same time, it is useful to reflect about crisis resolution methods by conducting an analysis early on of strategies, including prevention strategies. This includes taking into account factors which could provoke crises which reconstruction and development projects can tackle in order to limit their effects. Ideally, during the rehabilitation phase, crises can also bring opportunities to improve the situation, in terms, for example, of access to services, improving the distribution of natural resources and the fruits of development, the vitality of civil society and public sector governance.

### 3.2 LRRD Country Examples

#### 3.2.1 Haiti: LRRD in Post Disaster Reconstruction

It was in an already economically, institutionally and socially fragile Haitian context that an earthquake of magnitude 7 on the Richter scale hit Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area on 12 January 2010, killing almost 230 000 people and leading to the displacement of more than 2 million people. Several months later, the country was affected by one of the worst cholera epidemics globally in recent decades which killed more than 6 000 people (Bhattacharjee/Lossio 2011: 1).

During the first crucial months, the EU delegation in Port au prince was largely dysfunctional, with its office building structurally affected by the earthquake and most of the staff evacuated to Santo Domingo. On the DG ECHO side, however, the team in place immediately started the assessments with the UN, the NGO and the Red Cross. In the hours following the earthquake of 12 January 2010, DG ECHO rapidly mobilized funds both through the European Civil Protection mechanism and by making funds available to its partners via primary emergency, emergency and ad hoc funding decisions (Ashton/Georgieva 2010). These efforts continued in response to the cholera crisis from October 2010. At the end of 2010 and during the first weeks of 2011, DG ECHO clarified its objectives for 2011 as well as its coordination strategy with other European instruments and the Member States (ECHO 2011).

Despite a lot of good will and clear wish to improve the situation, it has been difficult for the development instruments such as the Food Security Thematic Programme or the Water Facility which are available in a centralized manner in Brussels (DG DEVCO) to take over from DG ECHO’s funding, particularly because schedules and disbursement delays are not compatible. DG ECHO had to fund the

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19 ECHO has been running programmes in Haiti for more than fifteen years. These programmes have concerned issues related to disaster preparedness (DIPECHO programmes), the response to natural disasters and the humanitarian consequences of political and economic turmoil (different types of emergency decisions). On the basis of an analysis of the humanitarian situation carried out in 2007, an ad hoc decision was made in 2008 which allowed programmes in the sector of Maternal and Child Health to be funded, complementing the funding of projects in connection with decisions made on the Food Aid budget line. In 2009, to respond to the high levels of malnutrition following the hurricanes of 2008, ECHO opened an office in Port-au-Prince and established a Global Plan.

introduction of the LRRD process without having the appropriate tools (such as a timeframe which is too short). The NGO coordination body VOICE also diagnosed a serious funding gap in Haiti and a lack of coordination (VOICE 2012: 10). However, the advocacy work carried out by DG ECHO’s Technical Assistants has allowed certain opportunities to be identified, especially by ensuring that some funds from the EDF B envelope could be allocated to badly needed urban reconstruction programmes. As the priorities of the 10th EDF were not re-adapted to the post-earthquake situation, important funding opportunities for the reconstruction were lost. In general, funding mechanisms for the transition still need to be invented.

In a poor country which has been devastated by a series of tragic events, the state’s ability to provide a minimum amount of public services is very limited (no coherent tax system, widespread poverty, etc.). Funding social services during the reconstruction phase should be a central preoccupation of donors. Specific budgetary aid initiatives are therefore quite indispensable and in most instances can be introduced through existing funding instruments in order to avoid new institutional layers and their related transaction costs, but monitoring systems and the accountability of national institutions need to be reinforced.

3.2.2 Chad: getting beyond humanitarian aid

Since 2003, Chad has taken in more than 300,000 refugees from Sudan and the Central African Republic and has seen approximately 180,000 persons displaced internally (Grünewald/Sokpoh/Saillard 2007: 10). These population movements have been spread out over a number of years, and have followed different patterns. The involvement of the EC and its different political, military, humanitarian and development instruments in Chad illustrate how complex LRRD can be. The EC has a significant presence in Chad with DG ECHO administering the EC’s humanitarian programmes. Some EU member states with a long working tradition in Africa such as France and Germany are also present. Next to mobilizing nearly all the financial instruments available in terms of assistance, the EU delegation in N’djamena also plays an active political role. In parallel the EU has been very involved in the attempts to reach a peace agreement for Darfur and South Sudan. The mandate of the EU Special Representative for Darfur was extended to Chad and Central African Republic as it became necessary to analyse the situation at regional level. On the humanitarian side, DG ECHO has been active in Chad since 2004, when the crises in the Central African Republic and Darfur first overflowed into Chad, and refugee camps were set up in the south and east of the country.

On both a regional and national level, the dynamics of the situation in Chad and its potential repercussions in humanitarian terms posed a significant challenge to the EC. Chad shows all the characteristics of a fragile state, notably fundamental problems of governance, deeply flawed democratic processes and rampant corruption. With some zones in acute crisis, others in a state of protracted crisis, and other areas apparently stabilizing and improving, Chad represents a typical case of a “contiguum”, a context in which a wide variety of different situations exist at the same time.

Four main phases can be identified, with some degree of overlap between them:

- The acute crisis phase in which the first significant wave of refugees from Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as internal displacement of Chadians, saw the creation of provisional camps all along the border with Sudan and the Central African Republic.
- The stabilization phase, as the crisis continued, with no solution resolving the causes of the crisis (conflict in Darfur and Central African Republic, tensions in Chad).
- The adaptation phase, requiring the management of unforeseen humanitarian emergencies. This phase included further displacement and urbanization with some returns being noted. During this phase some Chadians were also displaced in the opposite direction, into Darfur.
The post-crisis phase, requiring specific engagement of development instruments to support returns to areas of origin and the restore a certain level of economic and political stability.

In Chad, the debate about LRRD, especially refugee self-sufficiency and their possible integration into the existing socio-economic context, with an access to basic services, was key in the analysis of the refugees from the Central African Republic in the south (Groupe URD 2008) while in the Eastern part, the question was whether or not can Internally Displaced People (IDP) move back to their areas of origin or should they stay and integrate as a new component of urban centers.

The “Darfur” effect led to a significant mobilization of the big humanitarian donors, in order to cope with the situation in eastern Chad. A UN Mission (MINURCAT) and an EU military deployment (EUFOR) were put in place (Seiber 2007) under the coordination of a specific Chadian institution, the CONAFIT (Commission National pour l’Assistance aux Forces Internationales au Tchad). The deployment of EUFOR and MINURCAT has once again brought up the difficult question of civil-military coordination and the fear that MINURCAT and EUFOR’s “humanitarian” actions could lead to the blurring of lines between civil and military actors has often been expressed and discussed with the High Commander of EUFOR, MINURCAT, OCHA, and various donors, as certain EUFOR national detachments conducted civil-military projects such as the Quick Impact Projects. Humanitarian actors have clearly expressed their concerns with regard to this issue. DG ECHO supported efforts to clarify the distinction between its partners and military actors21, particularly through supporting OCHA and the NGO Coordination Committee. The IfS has been used to support the setting up of MINURCAT, more specifically to put in place the Chadian component of the police, which will ensure security in and around the refugee and displaced persons camps. It also supports the census process in preparation for the next elections. The funding involved is considerable and includes EUR 10 million for the Integrated Security Detachment in 200822, a dedicated mechanism of the Chadian police for securing the area where aid was distributed.

Among the typical LRRD tools, the PAS (Stabilization Programme) was designed to stabilize eastern Chad. The programme aims at ensuring that Chadian displaced persons and refugees can move back to their regions of origin and that the host population can benefit from the assistance allocated to that region, thereby avoiding further tension. By doing so it should contribute to a smooth transition from relief to development, analyzing rehabilitation and long-term development programs so that the process of returns and reintegration is supported.

Recently, humanitarian donors have begun to give serious consideration to LRRD connected to the more long term challenges of preventing the establishment of a “dependency syndrome” in the camps and IDP settlements protecting natural resources at risk due to the camps and sites, the issue of self-sufficiency and the question of displaced persons returning to their villages of origin. The European Commission has made a considerable effort in mobilizing significant resources for its LRRD programme in the south (a new initiative launched by the EC Delegation in Ndjamena under the Food Security thematic programme, EU 2007) and the “Programme d’Accompagnement à la Stabilisation” (PAS, financed through the 9th EDF) and the support to a special corps of the Chadian Police deployed in the East through the Stability Instrument.

In the south, the multi-sector programme for the socio-economic integration of the local population and refugees in the Grande Sido area, known as the LRRD project, was planned for a duration of four years as


22 http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/deltcd/fr/eu_and_country/fiches_projets/FP10_IFS-RRM_147-346%20_DIS.htm
a multi-partner project, targeting the resident population in Grande Sido (total of 103,000 people), with a particular focus on refugees in Yaroungou camp (approx. 13,000 people) and the local population of the villages between Danamadji and Maro-Sido (approx. 40,000 people). The project contributed to improve living conditions for the local population and refugees in the Grande Sido area, and secondly to reduce the risk of insecurity brought about by local inter-community conflicts by promoting the socio-economic integration of the affected populations (locals and refugees) in Grande Sido.

Both the PAS in the East and the LRRD project in the South are innovative approaches for the capacity of the commission to implement its LRRD commitments: the first one with a more political goal, thus creating some tensions with the humanitarian agencies, including DG ECHO partners, the second one more linked to the needs of the populations in a context of declining humanitarian interest. It can be noted that assistance provided by DG ECHO is linked to vulnerability rather than the legal status of populations (displaced persons, refugees, host population). This approach is very useful to prevent imbalances and creates a conceptual framework that is conducive to LRRD, as host populations are no longer only considered to be the audience of development cooperation.

3.2.3 Horn of Africa: LRRD and building resilience

Over the last two decades, the Horn of Africa has been suffering from recurrent conflicts (of different intensities), droughts and floods. Combined with disruptions in world economy, high speed of urbanization and volatile prices this resulted into sustained high levels of under-nutrition and food insecurity. DG ECHO and other EC instruments have been mobilized regularly and significantly during this period, including for drought prevention and preparedness. The 2010-11 combination of drought, conflict and financial crisis, which affected the livelihoods of millions of people, with a significant toll in terms of loss of lives triggered another large scale mobilization: the EC alone allocated EUR 181 million from the EU budget. Food security also features prominently in the long-term cooperation programmes financed by the EU in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, Uganda, as well as in Somalia.

A new initiative, the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa\(^\text{23}\), was designed to set out a comprehensive approach to tackle the challenges of the region as a whole. It tries to build on the efforts of the drought prevention and preparedness set up before in order to strategically build resilience to food insecurity and malnutrition in the Horn of Africa. Humanitarian funding, notably the 2012 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) for the Horn of Africa, will cover a Drought Risk Reduction Action Plan for the Horn of Africa Region as well as an emergency preparedness component mainstreamed in specific country operations where necessary. The IFS will support rural resilience and food security in Southern Ethiopia with an allocation of EUR 13.75 million\(^\text{24}\). Various forms of development assistance, including the Food Security Thematic Programme of the DCI for LRRD interventions, the MDG Initiative financed from the EDF, notably for a planned programme on rangeland management in Somalia, the EDF regional cooperation programme in support of regional livestock projects, covering drought and climate change adaptation, as well as disease surveillance for trade, funds that have recently been allocated for additional EDF country financing for Somalia, has been mobilized. In addition, other possible reallocation of EDF funds for additional country financing for Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya are being explored. Other relevant programmes are at the initiation stage such as the Global Alliance for Sahel Initiative (AGIR) and can still be adjusted (e.g. the programme to support nutrition strategies in West and East Africa)\(^\text{25}\). Currently, the EU is developing a strategy for the


\(^{24}\) SHARE: Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience, SWD(2012)102 final, 11/04/2012

\(^{25}\) Financed from the FSTP (EUR 15 million) and implemented by UNICEF (source: interview with EC staff)
Horn of Africa with a multi-layered and multi stakeholder approach: the Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience (SHARE) initiative26:

- At country level, the SHARE Initiative is supporting programmes which try to build resilience in post-affected communities in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.
- At the regional level, it is supporting interventions at Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) level to improve regional integration through capacity building in international trade standards. Moreover, the SHARE initiative aims at supporting projects and programmes that aim at preventing, mitigating and managing natural disasters, regional food security and risk management. It does this by contributing to the regional operational disaster budget and inland water resource management in the IGAD region. The EU also funds a regional DRR action plan supporting DRR community-based operations, their coordination with existing national policies, as well as advocacy, awareness and dissemination of good practices and lessons learnt from the community based activities.

Somalia represents a specific case, given its long conflict and the absence of an effective central government. While the north has been able to establish relative stability and an adequate form of governance, the central and southern parts have seen regular armed conflict, with insufficient consolidation of power. In view of the difficulty in having a long-term perspective to Somalia, development cooperation is mainly present with longer-term funding in the more secure and stable regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Humanitarian aid and shorter-term Food Facility and humanitarian emergency funds are focusing on insecure areas of south-central Somalia, where needs are high but access to the populations is restricted and dangerous.

Thanks to the opportunities offered by DG ECHO’s food assistance policy, the interventions in the food sector in the Horn can use since 2010 a new palette of options, which are a mix of humanitarian and development tools, supported by relatively functional local markets. In addition to classical food aid, livelihood support, cash transfers activities and vouchers schemes (for water, seeds and tools etc), and recovery assistance in favour of the farmers and herders communities are currently showing a very promising path towards a more robust and resilient recovery. Development assistance funding in this domain, mainly from the DCI, is geared towards natural resource management, support to sustainable farming production, animal health and veterinary services delivery, livestock export marketing and trade, capacity development of livestock sector institutions, integrated support to rural livelihood and information analysis (water and land information management). Projects have for many years supported the establishment of a stable commercial agricultural sector (e.g. improved seeds). In the whole Horn of Africa, production activities are also related to rangeland management, livestock health and processing/commercialisation of livestock products.

EU humanitarian assistance plans to continue to support a wide range of interventions ranging from short term life-saving activities and protection of livelihoods to more systemic support of the creation of the conditions that can support resilient communities. DG ECHO’s drought preparedness programme in the Horn was a useful endeavour towards emergency preparedness and DRR against the high frequency of drought in that region, but should be complemented by specific development investments and to address the structural issues of degradation of natural resources, insufficient governance, economic destitution, and conflict.

At the regional, national and local levels, close coordination between the various humanitarian and development assistance tools is necessary in order to avoid inconsistencies or overlaps concerning for

instance livelihood support and cash- as well as voucher-based safety nets. This is far from being the case yet. An improved analysis on the impact and adequacy of current food security and food assistance initiatives is required.

3.2.4 Afghanistan: LRRD in conflict zones

The EU has engaged in Afghanistan for a long time with different instruments. DG ECHO financed many different programmes throughout the country and DG RELEX started to use the “Aid to Uprooted people” budget line in the nineties. With an office in Peshawar and direct land access to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass, this instrument was very involved in the first “LRRD-like” approaches in Afghanistan, supporting the reinstallment of Afghan refugees in Eastern and Central provinces.

The events of 9/11 led to renewed involvement of the EU in post-Taliban Afghanistan, but many questions should be raised about the strategies that have been adopted. The challenges of LRRD in Afghanistan are probably among the most complicated and potentially dangerous ones. The EU engagement in Afghanistan took the form of support to humanitarian aid, support to the political process and to key development sectors. The National Indicative Plan (NIP)’s priority sectors comply with the three pillars of the Government, namely Security, Governance and the Rule of Law and Economic and Social Development. Under the Security Pillar, the EU supports the Afghan National Police. Moreover, the regional programme for dealing with illegal trafficking and the mine action programme aim to contribute to an improvement in overall security. For the Governance and Rule of Law Pillar, the EC supports interventions in the justice sector and more generally to the establishment of functioning local government structures. Under the Economic and Social Pillar, the EC reinforced programmes in rural development, health and social protection. The guiding principle underpinning the NIP is that of increased focus of EC assistance on the sub-national level in selected northern and eastern provinces. The EC also remained involved at the national level for some aspects of its programmes – assistance to key ministries such as the Ministry of Health as well as work in the areas of counter-narcotics and justice.

Among other key dilemmas, EC aid in Afghanistan underlined the difficulties involved in working with national authorities27 when the country is still in conflict and that it remains essential to ensure that humanitarian principles, especially independence and impartiality, are upheld. The fact that some EU member states have had a clear political, counter-narcotic and security agenda for Afghanistan (Grünewald 2005) has strongly influenced their approach to the LRRD process. The EC’s agenda has not been as political and has had a more classical post-crisis approach with an expected transition between DG ECHO and the developmental budget lines. Managing humanitarian aid and the transition to development during crisis inception or in post-conflict situations when insecurity is still high is a real challenge. The militarized option (PRT system) first chosen by NATO and partly supported financially by the EC raises several questions. It has contributed significantly to the deterioration of humanitarian space for civilian actors. In addition, in a context moving slowly back to war and often affected by natural disasters, the low priority given to disaster preparedness could have devastating effects.

The EC has clearly indicated its choice in favour of the “aid for trade” paradigm. The development of the Afghan private sector is of great importance, but applying this strategy in such a fragile and volatile context and leaving aside the less productive areas and socio-economically marginalized populations has contributed to the current decline in the situation. If money is only invested in sectors where there is ‘value for money’, there is a risk that Afghanistan will develop at different speeds in different areas. If the

27 cf. ANDS 2006
aid sector continues to do business in this way, the political repercussions will not be positive. NGOs display a much more cautious position.

In 2004, the EC began to fund programmes with a clear “LRRD” label with food security interventions in areas affected by natural disasters and prolonged insecurity in Afghanistan (FSTP (EC) No. 21 02 01 – 200828) The EC funded several aid packages aiming at facilitating the return and reintegration of Afghan refugees and IDPs. Commission’s funds covered multi-sectorial support for the most vulnerable people including a response to the urgent need for improved water, sanitation and hygiene condition, including battle-affected IDP’s and to mitigate the consequences of the 2006 drought.

The most critical challenges of LRRD are29:

- the role of the State, its relations with civil society and how to strengthen its capacity to ensure the rule of law and deliver public services;
- moving from direct delivery to a support position which, in an ideal LRRD process, should contribute to the recognition of the State’s institutions;
- shifting from free handouts to cost recovery or private systems in order to genuinely move towards sustainability;
- the capacity to adjust and adapt to turbulence in transition situations where it is equally important to be able to shift back to a crisis response mode and to link humanitarian aid and development;
- the militarization of the reconstruction through the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams). NATO has been involved in Afghanistan since 2004 and has regularly repeated its commitment to reconstructing the country. It has put PRTs at the centre of its LRRD strategy. Initially a US concept, the EC became involved with PRTs through funding and then troops from EU member states began to create their own. Indeed, as EU public opinion was very concerned about the deployment of troops to Afghanistan, the rehabilitation/development alibi via PRTs was often used as justification. Despite a high level of reluctance among Europe’s public opinion, in 2006 the EC delegation in Kabul allocated resources to a PRT operation. The space for civilian aid actors in Afghanistan has clearly been undermined by this new political and military strategy (Grünewald et al. 2007, Róisin 2006). NGOs have to work alongside armed forces and the boundaries between them and their roles are less and less obvious for the population and the armed opposition forces which increases the danger for the NGO.

There is considerable competition between NGOs due to the systematic recourse to calls for proposals and tenders. This raises the following questions: Who should replace international and national NGOs? What kind of capacities have been or are being put in place? How should NGOs redefine their positions and strategies?

Developing a dual capacity to work in crisis situations and support development efforts are key for the future of Afghanistan’s aid sector. Just as nobody can seriously challenge the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities in taking the prominent role, there remains a need for a multiple and diversified aid community, with different approaches and operating methods. This is what LRRD implies in turbulent times.

28 The Call for proposals used terms such as “vulnerability linked to conflict and disaster”, “recovery from disaster” and “strengthening resilience”.
4. THE FUTURE FINANCING OF LRRD ACTIVITIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW PROPOSED DCI

Analysis has shown that in order to promote LRRD remaining tensions concerning mandates, objectives and methodologies would need to be overcome and tackled more openly also on the conceptual level. Moreover, the new EU-Development architecture should help to ensure a better linkage between emergency situations and long term development strategies. Overcoming the challenges on the conceptual level and increasing LRRD in both development and humanitarian sectors requires the formulation of clear legal provisions and guidelines. This is even more important as in the implementation many organisations do combine humanitarian and development activities and are caught in a bureaucratic logic that constructs clear division lines with differentiated funding instruments. Thus, they are frequently faced with funding problems in the transition period and/or for combined activities (more than 90 % of polled NGOs agree that fragmented instruments hamper adequate funding / Annex 1 q. 8). Therefore, “more clarity on boundaries and areas for potential integration would help promote LRRD” (Koddenbrock/Büttner 2009: 121).

4.1 The provisions in the proposed DCI

The current DCI regulation which has been established in December 2006 and expires on 31 December 2013 only includes vague references to LRRD as an approach. Various reviews of the DCI have already expressed the shortcomings of the instrument concerning the linking between crisis situation and long term development policy. One of these shortcomings is the unclear definition regarding situations of fragility and post crisis.

Article 10 of the proposed next DCI (EC 2011f) refers to the programming and the allocation of funds and promotes both increased cooperation between EU and Member States and civil society participation. With regard to multiannual indicative allocations it is also stated that “alongside the specificity of the different programmes, the particular difficulties faced by countries or regions that are in crisis, vulnerable, fragile, in conflict or disaster prone” shall be taken into account (EC 2011f: Art. 10/3, p. 24). Some funds may be left unallocated (art. 10/4, p. 24). Moreover, indicative allocations may be increased or decreased “as a result of reviews, particularly in the light of special needs such as those resulting from a crisis, post-crisis or fragility situation” (EC 2011f: Art. 11/5, p. 25). Similar provisions that leave certain funds unallocated and allow for adjustment of the indicative allocation following an ad-hoc review can also be found in the thematic programmes (Art. 13/, p. 26). However, in the current proposal for a new DCI regulation there is no specific purpose defined for the use of unallocated funds. If they were explicitly linked to LRRD objectives, this would constitute a good possibility for increased flexibility in funding instruments in thematic and geographical programmes.

An additional article 12 is particularly concerned with the “Programming for countries in crisis, post-crisis or fragility situation” (EC 2011f: Art. 12, p. 25f), which DG ECHO sees as a good compromise for strengthening LRRD also in the legal provisions (interviews). This article particularly emphasizes post-conflict situations where LRRD is mentioned explicitly “to help [affected countries] make the transition from an emergency situation to the development phase” (EC 2011f: Art. 12/1, p. 25). Not only for fragile countries, but also for countries that are regularly affected by natural disasters, provisions should be made in the programming to strengthen disaster preparedness, prevention and managing the consequences of such disasters (ibid.).

4.2 Suggestions for the proposed legal provisions for the DCI

The new formulations and especially Article 12 are a big step in the right direction which not only allows for more mainstreaming in indicative programmes but also for more flexibility in cases of crisis.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that considerable sums are being earmarked in the current proposal for climate change activities and environmental objectives (at least 50% of the thematic programme on Global Public Goods which corresponds to 27% of total DCI funds). These funds will also be spent on climate change adaptation which contributes to increased disaster preparedness with regard to disasters induced by climate change.

However, this is certainly not sufficient to effectively ensuring LRRD. Earmarking funds for climate change activities without further specifying the objectives does not say much about what activities are actually spent on DRR or disaster preparedness. Moreover, disaster preparedness is not only a by product of climate change adaptation, but must be seen under a holistic approach which also touches other sectors such as education, health, capacity building etc. Here, it would be important to include the lessons learnt from existing DIPECHO programmes and intensify exchange and coordination in order to intensify the double effect of financing climate change adaptation and DRR.

With regard to the opposite direction of the link, especially the often observed grey zone between short-term relief interventions and longer-term development, the problem of the funding gap is targeted by the above mentioned provisions (unallocated funds and increased mainstreaming in the programming). However, these provisions also need to be implemented. As moving on in the transition to longer-term development automatically implies increased engagement with local authorities and the national government, the DCI and the indicative programmes play a decisive role for LRRD. Therefore, the regulations should be much more specific in tying up the unallocated funds with LRRD measures. Especially in Art. 10/4 reference should be made to the use of these funds to ensure the transition from emergency aid to long-term development. A situation of special needs (see Art. 11/5, p. 25), especially following a military, institutional or humanitarian crisis, might not only require the increase of funds but might also ask for an adaptation in indicative allocations, priorities and aid modalities. Therefore, respective provisions should more precisely foresee the option of adapting cooperation objectives and modalities.

With regard to the IfS, the Commission Staff Working Paper (SEC(2011) 868 final) accompanying the Budget 2020 clearly suggests that “the respective geographical instruments should be the default instruments to fulfil the bridging role following humanitarian actions of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)” while “IfS should only intervene in this area whenever these instruments cannot be mobilised (EDF, DCI, ENPI, IPA) to provide an efficient response” (EC 2011e: 209). In order to implement this recommendation we suggest to include such a clear formulation in article 12 of the new DCI and to hold on to the term “LRRD” as defined in the 2001 Communication and other documents.

4.3 Additional suggestions for and beyond the DCI

It is still unclear how strategic planning and programming developed by the delegations and the headquarter of EEAS can be combined with the responsibility of DG DEVCO to spend the money for implementing development programmes and linking those with recovery in the cases of eventually crisis situations. Apart from a stronger reference to LRRD in the proposals for the new DCI, LRRD also has to be considered more strongly in the geographical development instruments as an approach that needs to be included in the risk assessment of Multi-annual Indicative Programmes (MIP), National Indicative Programmes (NIP), Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) or, if existent, in the CSP (cf. Figure 2). This has to be formulated in the templates for CSP and similar strategies should be considered as an integrating part of action plans. Especially in the transition there needs to be a clear mandate and
engagement of the DCI in order to ensure resilience and recovery and avoid a return to the crisis situation.31

**Figure 2: Mainstreaming LRRD in the Budget Programming**

![Diagram showing steps in mainstreaming LRRD](Image)

*Source: Authors’ illustration*

As for the IfS the interaction of the new draft DCI with the new proposed Instrument for Stability is defined in Article 2 (3): “Union assistance under this Regulation shall be complementary to that provided for under related Union instruments for external assistance. It shall be provided only to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under those instruments” (EC 2011g: 11). This proposal is consistent with the aims defined in the current regulation for the IfS (EU 2006b: 2). The EDF and the DCI have also weak references to conflict prevention and peace building which could be enhanced. A stronger reference to conflict prevention could have positive implications for an efficient coordination between the IfS and the other long term instruments (ECDPM 2012). According to a 2011 evaluation of the IfS one major problem is that conflicts are seen as a separate issue by EU stakeholders and are not interconnected to long term strategies defined by EDF and DCI (ADE 2011).

In order to ensure an efficient internal coordination in each of the relevant instruments and with the IfS we suggest including conflict sensitivity and peace building into the Annual and Multiannual Programming of the long term instruments and frameworks. The distinctive nature of the Humanitarian Instrument has to be preserved. The existing administrative Units within EEAS and DEVCO could further build capacity and intensify coordination in conflict prevention and peace building without creating additional costs as suggested by the evaluation (ADE 2011).

Apparently, the commitment of EU Delegations to LRRD is at times rather unclear. Procedures are said to take too much time, e.g. for re-budgeting approval (survey) and there is a “lack of transparency and predictability of the call for proposal processes” (CONCORD 2012: 7). The establishment of LRRD “focal points” could help promoting the topic if connection points and clear responsibilities in EU Delegations improve communication with NGOs and other actors (UN, etc.) concerning LRRD mechanisms and options. This helps enhancing the quality of projects and programming but, however, can also be challenging due to the limited capacity of delegation staff (CONCORD 2012: 12).

Capacity development, also regarding crisis prevention and peace building, for personnel engaged in relief and recovery activities is required to help overcome some of the key “cultural gaps” and to ensure better understanding between the development and the humanitarian communities. According to DG ECHO, legal instruments provide a framework for LRRD, but the space needs to be used and known by people on the ground through capacity building and awareness raising. Also in Brussels, the concept of LRRD is not necessarily known by EU staff. Especially DG DEVCO and EEAS should try to raise awareness and understanding on LRRD more prominently within their own institutions. After all, LRRD very much

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31 The need to incorporate LRRD in CSPs has also been highlighted by VOICE in 2001 already: [http://60gp.ovh.net/~ngovoice/documents/LINKING%20_RELIEF_TO_REHABILITATION_AND_DEVELOPMENT_ideas.pdf](http://60gp.ovh.net/~ngovoice/documents/LINKING%20_RELIEF_TO_REHABILITATION_AND_DEVELOPMENT_ideas.pdf) (p. 6).
Strengthening LRRD in the EU's financing instruments depends on political will and commitment (survey: 1/3 of respondents think that the EU has a clear strategy on LRRD, whereas 2/3 do not see a clear strategy; q. 2 Annex I).

4.4 Suggestions concerning the Humanitarian Aid Instrument

The Commission proposes to use the Humanitarian Aid Instrument for crisis response prevention and response (SEC(2011) 867 final; SEC(2011) 868 final), not as a crisis management instrument (as clearly stated in the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid). The Lisbon Treaty has defined the EU’s Humanitarian Aid as a self-standing policy in the area of external action. The proposed MFF calls for strengthening Humanitarian Aid so that the EU will continue to react in a flexible, principled and adequate manner in responding to natural and man-made disasters. The Working Group recommends to further ease the administrative burdens and streamline the procedures for rapid mobilization of humanitarian aid.

According to Commissions Reports on the Action Plan for Humanitarian Aid, substantial progress in priority actions concerning LRRD has been realized (SEC(2008)1991; COM(2010) 722 final). As referred to in the “Aid continuum” a list of countries requiring priority LRRD has been established, best practice awareness has increased and the focus on EU support to LRRD has been reinforced. A review of transition mechanisms has been undertaken at EU level and recommendations for further improvements have been considered. According to DG ECHO (cf. ECHO 2010) “managing transition and LRRD has proven to be a challenge for country desk officers and personnel in the field in different contexts (such as in Haiti and Pakistan)” and the level of success is not always “as such considered impressive due to the different natures of the funding instruments” (ECHO 2010: 117).

For a better implementation of LRRD in the Humanitarian Aid Instrument framework, however, the following suggestions should be considered:

- Define a common strategic framework for articulation, communication, coordination and change of information with geographical development instruments.
- Strengthen the cooperation with DG DEVCO by defining and implementing exit strategies in order to better define the timeframe of intervention.
- Considering that the last Communication on LRRD was formulated in 2001 implementing organisations also recommend to draft an update. However, the impact of Communications seems to be limited and therefore should be backed up by a staff working paper, an action plan and a monitoring process.

4.5 Suggestions for financing future LRRD activities

The Commission’s proposal for the MFF 2014-2020 consists of two communications (COM(2011) 500 final Part I and II) and an accompanying ‘staff working paper’ (SEC(2011) 868 final). Expenditure proposed under Heading IV (‘Global Europe’) represents EUR 70 billion, i.e. 6.8% of the total MFF. This constitutes an increase of 5.7% in real terms as compared to 2007 – 2013. The Commission proposes to allocate a further EUR 30.3 billion outside the budget to support the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and Overseas Countries and Territories through the 11th intergovernmental European Development Fund (EDF). Furthermore, an additional EUR 2.5 billion is proposed for the Emergency Aid Reserve and for the Global Climate and Biodiversity Fund (See Figure 3).
The Commission recognizes the increasing significance of humanitarian aid due to the increase in the number of natural and man-made disasters and their economic impact. The present MFF calls for systematic action at European level to strengthen preparedness and to enhance response capacities, both inside and outside the EU. This is not sufficiently reflected in the proposed budget for the period 2014-2020 since there is only EUR 6.4 billion for seven years for the Humanitarian Aid Instrument. Currently, experience shows that, on average, EUR 1 billion is needed per year.

According to the priorities defined by the Commission in the Agenda 2020 and the increased emphasis on crisis prevention and resolution, the IfS gains more weight than in the current MFF (Görtz/Sherriff 2012). In the new MFF the EC proposes to allocate 4 % of heading IV to the IfS. However, as mentioned above, the main source of additional funding for LRRD actions should come from the geographical development cooperation instruments (EDF, DCI, ENPI, IPA) (SEC(2011) 868 final). While this approach is welcomed in order to mainstream LRRD in country programming and longer term cooperation, it must be doubted whether funding provisions are sufficient to cope with these requirements. This is especially the case as considerable earmarking is already foreseen for climate change activities, as well as interventions in the areas of social inclusion and human development. Although these areas could potentially become focal areas for LRRD approaches, too, this is certainly not automatically the case.

Humanitarian action cannot be funded from the DCI unless it is related to LRRD. Clarification about the role the DCI can play in the field of LRRD is still needed. According to several stakeholders interviewed for this research, “people are working in silos” and cooperation in the field is still difficult, because there are no clear delimitations for LRRD (see survey). We suggest defining detailed provisions in the geographical development cooperation instruments in order to assure that a flexible response is linked with necessary predictability.
Financing of LRRD activities has been a steady concern of implementing organisations in every phase of their interventions. Both humanitarian (ECHO) and development instruments (EDF and DCI) are confronted with restrictions when implementing LRRD: Humanitarian organisations have to act in a very short timeframe and under strict principles, while development instruments are very often constrained by the tight framework of long term development strategies (CSP) and lengthy procedures. Given the difficulties stated in this document and confirmed by surveys and interviews with stakeholders, some vital questions arise when discussing the funding of LRRD activities: Are the foreseen resources for humanitarian aid sufficient for implementing LRRD? If not, are the financial resources additional to all the instruments engaged in LRRD? In view of some positive experiences (Haiti, Chad/ cf. chapter 3), how could LRRD be more flexibly and systematically financed from the B-envelopes of the EDF or from the Emergency Aid Reserve? Is there potential for the creation of a specific LRRD fund?

Given current budget restrictions and the efforts of various stakeholders which point to a simplification and reduction of instruments and programmes, we would not suggest establishing a specific LRRD fund. Since there are scarce resources for external actions as a whole, the establishment of an additional LRRD fund could be detrimental to both the development and the humanitarian instruments. It would imply the establishment of institutional structures which might not reduce but rather increase the need for coordination and the transaction costs associated with it.

The grey zone is characterized by a lack of follow-up of short term funding and a lack of flexibility in longer term programmes. In order to bridge this gap and to allow for flexible intervention in case of unforeseen setbacks without putting ongoing projects at stake, the so called “crisis-modifier” has frequently been mentioned in recent LRRD discussion. The idea of this USAID approach is to reserve a certain percentage of development funding in a country for LRRD activities and thereby providing budget contingencies for post-emergency situations.

Increasing the flexibility of the existing instruments, especially the DCI and the EDF, is the most suitable way to avoid transaction cost. If the specifications to the Articles 10 and 11 mentioned above (chapter 4.1) are put in practice, the provisions for unallocated funds in the new DCI could serve as such a “crisis-modifier” and increase flexibility in funding. With regard to the DCI, the coordination role of Unit A5 within DG DEVCO, which is dealing with the specific challenges of situations of fragility (fragile states, post-crisis reconstruction), could be a way of strengthening the LRRD engagement. This unit should however be staffed with the proper mix of experience, i.e. field and HQ experience, otherwise it will become a technocratic structure disconnected from field realities.

However, a significant improvement of LRRD activities is only possible through a general increase of the budget allocations for development and humanitarian aid under Heading IV. For strengthening the EU’s external engagement according to Agenda 2020, current allocations are simply not sufficient, considering the increasing frequency of external shocks, both natural and manmade. As experience in the last five years has shown, humanitarian aid has also to be increased in order to be able to react in a timely and adequate fashion in case of crises and disasters. Examples of good LRRD practice have shown that increases in the funding level often lead to better results, i.e. sufficient funding is indispensable for addressing the problems effectively. Implementing organisations are requesting more predictability and reliability in financing to allow for addressing a wider range of structural causes of fragility.

Only an increase of DCI allocations could enhance a significant EU engagement in LRRD activities, so that resilience and transition could be profoundly consolidated and mainstreamed. Based on the new defined priorities Parliament and MS could ask the Commission to take all the necessary measures. In the

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32 ECHO’s DRR programme in the Horn of Africa has already made use of a crisis modifier that allows “to shift focus to a humanitarian response should conditions change significantly”: this received good ratings for improving flexibility (cf. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2012/Livelhood_interventions.pdf p.30)
DCI there could be a reserve that can be used in addition to the regular programming and funding pipelines, i.e. that is to be kept aside from the projects foreseen as part of the regular multiannual programming with partner countries. A more flexible allocation of resources at regional and country level is needed. This will be necessary if LRRD is to be considered an integral part of the EU’s flexible approach in response to crisis and fragility, including before and after the crisis.

Concerning humanitarian aid, we suggest a budget increase up to at least EUR 1 billion as proposed by many humanitarian organisations as well as by Claus Sorensen, General Director of DG ECHO. The effects of climate change, protracted conflicts, food crises and demographic developments, including accelerated urbanization and the associated increased risks, call for a stabilization of the humanitarian aid budget/funding level in order to avoid recurrent dependency on the Emergency Aid Reserve.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, LRRD is far more internalised in the humanitarian aid sector and the respective institutions and legal provisions than in the development sector. Corresponding to the nature of longer term development engagement, LRRD in the development sector is rather understood as enhancing resilience, disaster preparedness and prevention. Although this side of the coin is of utter importance, it would be equally important to address more precisely transition strategies and parallel linkages between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, especially in disaster prone areas. As humanitarian and development interventions are very often implemented simultaneously (contiguum), synergies need to be reinforced and the coordination between the Commission services and working methods enhanced. Communication between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO is regarded as good by respondents/interviewees, whereas the exchange of information with the EEAS could be further improved. If the IfS is to bolster LRRD linkages, it must not remain under the sole aegis of the EEAS with its strong security focus, but should allow for a more pronounced role of DEVCO Unit A.5 where developing countries are involved. It remains to be seen if this role can be fulfilled by the newly formed TISG. LRRD might have to address political fragility and state-building but is not necessarily synonymous with this. As matters currently stand, humanitarian aid and development cooperation run the risk of being dominated too much by the security concerns of the EU. Therefore, the EEAS needs to appreciate a coherent and comprehensive approach of LRRD and to reflect this in the IfS, instead of using it as a tool to (over)emphasize security interests in its foreign policy.

Although good efforts have been made by the different services in Brussels and at field level to improve the implementation of LRRD, some deficits still remain at the operational level as described in chapter 3 (lack of flexibility, speed and coordination, procedural or budgetary constraints). One very concrete consequence is the funding gap in the grey zone between relief and development. Funding instruments of the development sector have complex procedures for allocating funds, which are simply too long to respond in a flexible manner to transition contexts of crisis situations. The proposed new legal provisions for the DCI 2014-2020 set some good preconditions for increased flexibility in funding. The possibility to leave a part of the funds unallocated in the Multiannual Indicative Programmes, foreseen for both for geographical and thematic programmes, could considerably improve flexibility in the transition period and thus enhance LRRD. This, however, would require that the procedure to get access to these funds is speeded up. It would also be helpful if concrete reference were made in the provisions and templates for MIP, NIP, RIP and CSP in such a way that these programmes explicitly facilitate LRRD. Activities that are concerned with fostering resilience and disaster preparedness could also form part of the allocated funds in the indicative programmes. The country programming should also allow for proper reallocation

33 See the recent evaluation of the Commission’s humanitarian aid in urban settings.
of allocated funds to reconstruction efforts in case of a post-crisis situation. In such cases, fund allocation mechanisms might need to be revised in order to adapt to the fast tracks of post-crisis situations.

Moreover, the implementing actors of these unallocated funds should also be dealt with more flexibly. Currently, problems often arise from the fact that procedures remain actor driven rather than objective driven. Actors providing temporary protection and education for children in an emergency, for instance, need to transition over to the general national education system which is usually led by national governments including sometimes private actors. The current funding is driven by actors such as either CSOs, or international organisations, or governments, whereas the reality may be more complex. In order to make these funds effectively available for LRRD in a genuine transition, there must also be flexibility with regard to the actors.

Overall, the following recommendations can be made:

- LRRD should be seen as an approach rather than an option and could be mainstreamed in the programming of humanitarian aid and development cooperation programmes in countries prone to disasters (natural and man-made) or fragile state situations. Therefore, capacity building and training in crisis prevention and peace building for personnel engaged in relief and recovery activities is needed, both in EU institutions and on the ground. Also, the establishment of LRRD “focal points” should be followed more closely, i.e. to have a responsible contact person within EU Delegations.

- Furthermore, Multiannual Indicative Programmes, National and Regional Indicative Programmes and Country Strategy Papers should include provisions on LRRD, also for allowing the adaptation of programming to emergency situations if required. In the transition period in particular, development actors need to have a clear mandate and engagement, e.g. via the DCI, in order to ensure resilience and recovery.

- Concerning the Humanitarian Aid Instrument, a common strategic framework for coordination and exchange of information with geographical development instruments and with DEVCO should be defined, that also considers exit strategies and timeframes of interventions.

- The main source of funding for LRRD actions should come from the geographical development cooperation instruments (EDF, DCI, ENPI, IPA) and LRRD should be mainstreamed in country programming and longer term cooperation. Detailed provisions have to be defined in order to assure that a flexible response is linked with necessary predictability of funding.

- The study does not suggest establishing a specific LRRD fund since coordination and transaction costs would increase. However, additional resources for the overall budget are needed for LRRD to be pursued more strongly from humanitarian aid and development cooperation instruments. Innovative financial tools such as a “crisis-modifier” or a reserve that derives from development funding for a specific country could be considered.

- The 2001 Communication on LRRD should be updated and supported by a staff working paper and an action plan. The explicit commitments to LRRD should not be diluted by loose provisions or a change of wording. It has to be ensured that enough flexibility is provided but that flexibility does not lead to arbitrariness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestion</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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<tr>
<td>Revise key EU Regulations (including the Regulation on Humanitarian Aid)</td>
<td>Regulations should offer a better division of tasks between the regulation and the policy documents allowing for a sound relationship between predictability and flexibility in responding to crisis situation without affecting long term objectives.</td>
<td>COM (500) final, SEC(2011) 868 final</td>
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<td>in order to offer an adequate level of detail concerning LRRD mandates and responsibilities.</td>
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<td>Ensure that LRRD is introduced as a guiding and comprehensive principle in the Multiannual Indicative Programmes</td>
<td>LRRD has to be perceived as part of Development policy and not only as an option in Humanitarian Aid.</td>
<td>Communication (COM (2001) 153 final), 2.1 and SEC 868</td>
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<td>Ensure the transition from one policy area to another with the set of instruments deployed on the ground (IF5, EDF, DCI) for a comprehensive EU approach to a specific crisis.</td>
<td>Transitions have to be perceived as complex situations where different actors in the areas of humanitarian aid, recovery, development and peace keeping have to work side by side for an extended period.</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid strategy for 2012 (SEC(2011) 1426 final)</td>
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<td>Introduce more flexibility in Country and Regional Strategy Papers so that DG DEVCO can become better involved in LRRD measures in emergency cases.</td>
<td>Experience shows that the evolution of crises, in particular conflicts, is unpredictable and therefore the Addendum to the CSP must ensure sufficient flexibility to allow quick adaptations to changing and unexpected situations.</td>
<td>Communication (COM (2001) 153 final)</td>
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<td>Draft LRRD initiatives by sector in close collaboration between humanitarian and development instruments and actors</td>
<td>Best practice cases show the advantages of identifying as early as possible the right approach to move from relief to development.</td>
<td>Communication (COM (2001) 153 final), COM(2010) 722 final, ECHO, Annual Report, 2010</td>
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<td>Establish a more regular monitoring of progress in implementation of the Action Plan as a whole that also captures progress made in LRRD implementation</td>
<td>EU actors need to improve their joint efforts to implement the Consensus and its Action Plan in order to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of EU aid.</td>
<td>Communication (COM (2001) 153 final), COM(2010) 722 final</td>
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<td>Increase the DCI allocations to enhance a significant EU engagement in LRRD activities, so that resilience and transition can be profoundly consolidated.</td>
<td>Since there are scarce resources for external actions as a whole, the establishment of an additional LRRD fund could be detrimental for both the development and the humanitarian instrument.</td>
<td>Communication (COM (2001) 153 final), 2.1 and SEC 868</td>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


- European Commission (2007): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.


Annex I: LRRD Survey

Südwind-Institut quantitative survey among humanitarian aid implementing organisations concerning European LRRD approach, institutions and instruments (Mai and June 2012). Participation: 50

EU LRRD Strategy

1. LRRD should be a binding approach for all funding instruments and implementing agencies.

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answered question 46
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2. The EU follows a clear strategy on LRRD.

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3. This EU institution is fully committed to LRRD:

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4. ECHO, EEAS and DEVCO have effective coordinating mechanisms concerning LRRD.

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5. There are conflicts of interests among ECHO, EEAS and DEVCO in respect of LRRD activities.

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Financial Aspects

6. There is a funding gap in the grey zone between relief and development.

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7. EU financial instruments are flexible enough to ensure effective transition / linkage.

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**answered question** 44  
**skipped question** 6

8. Fragmented instruments and EU structures make it difficult to apply for - and receive adequate funding.

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9. **The EU should make tangible changes to their financial instruments (please specify)**

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**Response Count**

- 44 answered question
- 6 skipped question

10. **EU funding instruments sufficiently consider Disaster Risk Reduction and other preventive measures.**

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**Response Count**

- 44 answered question
- 6 skipped question

**Operational Aspects**

11. **Communication and coordination on the ground among implementing organisations (NGO, UN) and EU bodies is adequate.**

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**Response Count**

- 45 answered question
- 5 skipped question

12. **On the ground administrative procedures / decision making structures need to be simplified.**

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**Response Count**

- 45 answered question
- 5 skipped question
13. Local stakeholders and beneficiaries are sufficiently involved in decision making and implementation of LRRD practices.

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answered question 45
skipped question 5

14. The needs assessment of ECHO (country/region, food assistance, global priority areas) is insufficient.

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answered question 45
skipped question 5

15. Needs assessment indicators are broadly accepted by involved stakeholders (UN organisations, NGOs, etc.).

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answered question 45
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### Annex II: LRRD on National and UN Level

#### The German approach to LRRD

Aid from the Federal Republic of Germany in response to crisis and post-crisis contexts includes several mechanisms established within the BMZ (German development administration), the KFW (financial establishment which works, amongst other things, in developing countries) and the GIZ (the implementing agency). The GIZ has a dual role as an operational agency for bilateral cooperation and a service provider for other national and international actors. The GIZ has set up a crisis prevention and conflict transformation department. It is important to point out the specific importance of EON funds, which concern development-orientated humanitarian actions and are a very original LRRD tool.

→ **Key to German approach to LRRD: having specialized tools**

#### The British approach to LRRD

The CHASE is an instrument for the production of policies and the development of strategies both at an operational level and in terms of their influence in international debates. The British work a great deal on an inter-ministerial basis (DFID, Foreign Affairs, and Defence) to support the development of a governmental strategy to stabilise post-conflict situations with a dual mandate which is both political and operational. The political mandate consists of preparing the government’s post-conflict strategy, including the concomitant military and humanitarian planning, and working more generally with the international community to disseminate better reconstruction practices and the sharing of responsibility during the sensitive phase of conflict resolution. The operational mandate consists of planning, applying and managing the United Kingdom’s civilian contribution in post-conflict reconstruction, including identifying and training civilian staff. The British are also very involved in numerous civil-military operations in connection with their management of crises. They have developed very robust CIMIC mechanisms to be deployed alongside military forces.

→ **Key to British approach to LRRD: Taking action as close as possible to decision-making centres and being a driving force behind LRRD approaches.**

#### The Swedish approach to LRRD

In 2004, the Swedish government began to focus on the prevention and management of conflicts and “shared security”. It established a relief and development body for this purpose, the SEKA, which is a department for cooperation with NGOs, humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention. 13 NGOs reached a long-term agreement with the SEKA, largely based on supporting local partner organisations, notably in post-conflict contexts. Thus, SIDA contributes to the development of democratic civil society, which is seen as a condition for the durability of peace. For a number of years now, Sweden has been experimenting with “mixed” teams to address humanitarian and development issues in a coordinated and sometimes simultaneous way. Teams of this kind, present in Afghanistan, RDC, Sudan, Iraq and Palestine, have tried to improve the performance of post-crisis rehabilitation programmes without compromising humanitarian principles (their approach being in keeping with the GHDI). This makes it possible to improve both the quality of humanitarian aid and the planning of the resumption of development while limiting the risk of gaps between the processes. This approach helps to avoid the negative effects of humanitarian aid and the recurrence of violence and conflict.

→ **Key to the Swedish approach: Ensure the best possible transitions while supporting the emergence of strong and structured civil societies in post-conflict contexts**

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34 Sources: Conflict impact Assessment for development projects, GIZ, Sector Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation 2001; Sites: [www.giz.de](http://www.giz.de); [www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de](http://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de)

35 Sources: [www.sida.se](http://www.sida.se)
The French approach to LRRD

In France, there is no obvious mechanism for dealing with LRRD issues. The Centre de Crise funds humanitarian action and, until recently, development projects were either directly run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cultural, linguistic and governmental cooperation) or a very small number were run via NGOs. Alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is the Agence française de développement (AFD) which essentially operates via loans to states and with delegated project management, generally via consultancy firms.

It has only been since the beginning of the 1900s that the AFD has been called upon to conduct operations in post-crisis contexts (Cambodia, Lebanon, Kosovo, Haiti, etc.). The French authorities do not take full advantage of NGOs, even though these have acquired considerable experience whether in the area of development, humanitarian aid or post-conflict contexts.

→ Key to the French approach: political or media-based opportunism

The USA’s approach to LRRD

The US government, with whom the Commission has established a very fertile transatlantic dialogue, is an important actor in the management of crises, humanitarian crises and LRRD. US doctrine in terms of LRRD has two main areas: one is its contribution to the security of the United States and the other is the reinforcement of coordination between civilian aid organisations and the armed forces. There is interaction between several institutions. The State Department is the political decision-making body, which applies, for example, the doctrine of “state building”. The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) funds humanitarian and post-crisis reinsertion programmes for refugees and IDPs, either via the HCR or via the ICRC and large American NGOs. USAID brings together development tools, instruments for relief operations (Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance - OFDA) and a specialized conflict management structure, Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), which carries out analysis, provides strategic advice and acts as a warning system. USAID frequently conducts operations in LRRD contexts providing food aid on a massive scale either via the WFP (in connection with PRROs), or via large American NGOs (CARE, World Vision, CRS).

The main United Nations institutions involved in LRRD

UNDP’s BCPR: UNDP has created an ad hoc tool to work on crises: the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). UNDP’s post-conflict approach is linked to the UN reforms concerning crisis management. In this context, the BCPR conducts its activities within the UN structure with its specific thematic characteristics which often have “political” connotations. For an agency like UNDP, which necessarily works with and through national institutions, rebuilding national capacity and managing potentially explosive operations (DDR, support for the organisation of elections, etc.) are politically sensitive issues. As part of the UN humanitarian reform, and the Cluster approach, UNDP/BCPR has become involved in coordinating the Early Recovery cluster. This cluster, which should have a cross-sector aspect, is meant to have an operational role, which is far from simple: either it will not succeed in establishing itself (the case of Uganda, where it was transformed into a Governance, Infrastructures and Livelihood Cluster) or it takes a long time (the case of Chad where more than a year was needed to get a team in place). → key function of UNDP: To be present in meetings, in the field and in budget lines dedicated to crisis management and to facilitate the involvement of UNDP through the presence of specialised and competent representatives in these specific situations.

36 (Grunewald 2011) Réflexion stratégique sur les mécanismes de gestion et de financement des interventions dans les contextes de post crise, 2011, Groupe URD, 63 P.
Strengthening LRRD in the EU’s financing instruments

The High Commission for Refugees: Following a series of difficult experiences of large scale repatriation and reintegration programmes, the HCR has looked for better ways to manage questions of socio-economic reintegration and questions of protection in post-conflict situations. It has become increasingly involved in situations of internal displacement in which it has become a major partner of DG ECHO. → key function of HCR: to ensure that returning refugees and IDPs are able to reintegrate into their communities socially and economically and to ensure that the absorption capacity of host areas is reinforced in order to avoid secondary conflicts

World Food Programme: To deal with situations of protracted crises and post-conflict transition and withdrawal of humanitarian operations, the WFP has developed an ad hoc tool, Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, which differs from its Emergency Operations (EMOPS) in terms of the variety of activities that it allows, the variety of partners that it can involve, and its great flexibility which allows it to adapt to the uncertainties of post-conflict contexts and fragile peace. → key function of the WFP: To be active in the extremely volatile and changing contexts which characterise post-crisis situations

The FAO: Increasingly present in crisis and post-crisis contexts, the FAO has developed a complex strategy to combat food insecurity in post-crisis contexts and has become a major partner of DG ECHO. → key function of FAO: to help restore food security in post-crisis contexts and develop operational know-how to support its normative role.
POLICY DEPARTMENT

Role
Policy departments are research units that provide specialised advice to committees, inter-parliamentary delegations and other parliamentary bodies.

Policy Areas
Foreign Affairs
    Human Rights
Security and Defence
    Development
International Trade

Documents