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## **Effectiveness of current policy frameworks in mitigating climate-induced risks relating to human security and conflict – case study on the EU**

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### **Abstract**

This case study reviews the effectiveness of EU-level policies and measures for addressing the impacts of climate change on water, conflict and human security. It draws attention to gaps in the current policy framework and outlines actors' expectations and demands for a future framework. The EU's internal policy

framework covers many aspects of water management and climate change but has no overt focus on human security or conflict. The EUs external policy framework supports neighbouring and developing countries' broader development agendas which - depending on the country's needs and wishes - may or may not take the issues of water, climate change, human security or conflict into account. Furthermore, even if human security is considered implicitly by the EUs policy framework, it was perceived to be unlikely that a specific policy agenda addressing human security alone or as connected to water and climate change can be expected to develop in the near future.

### *Acknowledgement*

The authors would like to thank the interviewees who participated in this study - their contributions have been invaluable. Interviewees' contributions were in a personal capacity and not on behalf of the institutions to which they are affiliated. Furthermore, the conclusions of this report are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the interviewees.

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## Abbreviations

ACP – Africa Caribbean Pacific

COM – European Commission

CAP – European Union Common Agricultural Policy

CIS – Common Implementation Strategy of the Water Framework Directive

DG CLIMA – Directorate General for Climate Action

DG DEVCO – Directorate General for Development Cooperation – Europe Aid

DG ENV – Directorate General for Environment

DG EXPO – Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (European Parliament Secretariat)

DG HOME – Directorate General for Home Affairs

DG RELEX – Directorate General for External Relations

EEA – European Environment Agency

EEAS – European External Action Service

EIB – European Investment Bank

ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy

ENVSEC – Environment and Security Initiative

EP – European Parliament

EU – European Union

EUWI – European Union Water Initiative

GA – UN General Assembly

GCCA – Global Climate Change Alliance

GHG – Greenhouse Gas

IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IWRM – Integrated Water Resource Management

MDGs – Millennium Development Goals

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

MEP – Member of the European Parliament

MMES – Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel

MFF – Multiannual Financial Framework

MS – Member States

NGO – Non-governmental Organisation

RBMP – River Basin Management Plan

SLR – Sea-level rise

SWM – Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean

UfM – Union for the Mediterranean

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

WFD – European Union Water Framework Directive

WWF – World Wildlife Fund

WISE – Water Information System for Europe

## 1. Introduction

This case study provides a review and assessment of the effectiveness of the current European Union (EU) level policy framework<sup>1</sup> for addressing the impacts of climate change on water, conflict and human security<sup>2</sup> and perspectives on the future. The case study is based on the conceptual and methodological framework set out in the main report<sup>3</sup> and has been compiled through desk-based research and interviews with civil servants at EU and national level.<sup>4</sup> The study begins with a brief introduction to the implications of climate change for water, conflict and human security in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel (MMES) region and interviewee awareness of these issues. This is followed by an overview of current EU policies and programmes tackling these issues and how they approach interlinkages.<sup>5</sup> Using a policy cycle approach, the study then looks at factors, as perceived by interviewees, which impact the effectiveness the current policy framework for addressing these issues. It goes on to provide an overview of interviewee perceptions regarding the future of the EU policy framework. Based on the findings of the case study research and interviewee opinions, the study ends with insights on the relationship between climate change, hydro-conflict and human security and the future of the EU policy framework in this area.

## 2. Background

Whilst the EU is not considered to be as immediately affected by climate change as Sub-Saharan Africa, it is widely accepted that the Mediterranean will be one of the hardest hit by impacts on its water resources. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 4th Assessment, less frequent rainfall will exacerbate drought and decreases in groundwater recharge by more than 70% along the southern rim of the

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1 We use the term 'policy framework' to cover not only 'policies' (under which we include laws, strategic programs or long-term and consistent approaches on how to deal with certain issues) but also if/how policies are adopted as well if/how they are coordinated or integrated.

2 As interviewees were working at a policy-making rather than implementation level, the assessment of effectiveness is based on interviewees perceptions of the adequateness of the policy design rather than their effectiveness on the ground.

3 Gerstetter, C., McGlade, K., Vidaurre, R., and Tedsen, E, *Current Policy Frameworks for Addressing Climate-Induced Risks to Human Security and Conflict- An Assessment of Their Effectiveness and Future Perspectives*, CLICO, 2012.

4 A full list of interviewees can be found in Annex V. Interviews were carried out with thirteen civil servants across different EU institutions to provide a range of opinions on policies and processes relevant to the abovementioned themes. Two further civil servants from Spain were interviewed (see Annex IV) to provide a point of view from an EU Member State in the region of focus for this report (Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel (MMES)). Efforts were made to gather a range of interviewee opinions; nevertheless, these perspectives are only indicative as the full range of EU institutions was not included in this study due to available resources. Interviews were carried out with civil servants, rather than political representatives, who for the most part worked on the technical aspects of EU policy on climate change, water and development rather than the EUs broader agenda for security or conflict prevention.

5 We examine policies both within and beyond the EU. We use the term 'internal' to refer to EU policies aimed at EU Member States; 'regional' to refer to the European Neighbourhood Region (See Annex II); and 'external' to refer to EU policies aimed at third-countries beyond the EU and its neighbourhood.

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Mediterranean Sea.<sup>6</sup> Threats from desertification have been projected in Mediterranean-type ecosystems due to expansion of adjacent semi-arid and arid systems.<sup>7</sup> Land use, habitat fragmentation and intense human pressures will further limit natural adaptation responses.<sup>8</sup> The impacts of climate change on water resources are also widely acknowledged by policy makers, as highlighted in the increasing number of measures to tackle these issues. In terms of water policy, in the past, the EU has placed a strong focus on improving water quality as well as on flood management. However, the IPCCs 4th Assessment and conferences of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have led to a broadening of awareness that policies must also begin to seriously address climate change impacts on drought and sea-level rise (SLR), also outside of the EU.

So far, conflict over water resources within the EU is fairly limited, particularly in the case of inter-state conflict where settlements are easier to reach than as is the case for other states which lack the EUs tradition of cooperative conflict management.<sup>9</sup> Conflict in the EU over water resources is usually limited to intra-state conflict, as demonstrated in Spain where there was large public opposition to planned inter-basin water transfers to water scarce regions.<sup>10</sup> In addition, the EU - as well as its Member States (MS) - aims to protect and provide security to its citizens in various dimensions.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, the EU assumes that there is a reciprocal relationship between the security of the northern Mediterranean - which hosts a wealthy, developed and stable Europe, and that of the southern Mediterranean - which is home to the more fragmented North Africa and Middle East.<sup>12</sup> The EU must consider the implications of the dynamics of neighbouring regions not only due to the potential implications for the security and protection of its own citizens,<sup>13</sup> but also because the stated objectives of its external action include the

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6 Kundzewicz, Z.W., L.J. Mata, N.W. Arnell, P. Döll, P. Kabat, B. Jiménez, K.A. Miller, T. Oki, Z. Sen and I.A. Shiklomanov, "Freshwater Resources and Their Management, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability," in *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 976: 173-210.

7 *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds) *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 2007 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

8 Ibid.

9 Haftendorn, H., "Water and International Conflict," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (2000): 51-68.

10 Elena Lopez-Gunn, "Agua Para Todos: A New Regionalist Hydraulic Paradigm in Spain" 2, no. 3 (June 12, 2012): 370-394.

11 The Fundamental Charter of Rights of the European Union accords a number of protective rights to its citizens. These include, but are not restricted to the right: to life; to security of person; to social security and services; to healthcare; and to environmental protection. EU, "Fundamental Charter of Rights of the European Union Accords a Number of Protective Rights to Its Citizens," *Official Journal of the European Union* C 83/389 (2010), <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>.

12 Abdelwahad Biad, "Estabilidad y Conflictos En El Mediterráneo," *Afers Internacionals*, no. 37, Revista CIDOB (1997): 53-63. Stein, S., "The European Union and the Arab Spring. One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications," ed. Mark A. Heller, Yoel Guzansky (Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2012), [http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/revistas/revista\\_cidob\\_d\\_afers\\_internacionals/%28offset%29/42](http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/revistas/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/%28offset%29/42).

13 Art.3, European Union, *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union*, 2010.

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preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of international security.<sup>14</sup>

### 3. Awareness

General public awareness of the issue of climate change is high within the EU<sup>15</sup>, with around 20% perceiving it as the most important current threat.<sup>16</sup> During the interviews conducted for this case study, it was noted that EU citizens may not necessarily perceive the difference between mitigation and adaptation and although they may be aware of certain specific human security threats e.g. floods, members of the public do not generally make the conceptual link between these impacts and climate change.<sup>17</sup> The potential inter-linkages between climate change, conflict and human security have also been part of discussions in the public domain, for example in relation to the civil conflict in Sudan<sup>18</sup>

At the EU political and administrative level, impacts of climate change, including those on water, are also widely recognised: the EU has created policies for climate change mitigation and management of water resources (see Chapter 4) and the EU and its MS are vocal in their calls for action at international climate change and water fora such as the UNFCCC and the World Water Forum. In this way, awareness among interviewees<sup>19</sup> of both the physical impacts of climate change on water and of EU policy initiatives aimed at tackling these issues was, on the whole, very high. There has also been EU level recognition that climate change impacts on water resources may have broader implications for conflict<sup>20</sup> and human security<sup>21</sup> and some EU MS have been actively engaged in high level political debates on these issues.<sup>22</sup>

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14 Art.21 (2c), *Ibid.* ‘The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to...preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders’

15 Personal communication, EU official working on water issues

<sup>16</sup> See Special Eurobarometer 372 Climate Change, TNS Opinion & Social for Directorate General for climate action. Coordination from Directorate General for Communication (2011)  
[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_372\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_372_en.pdf) Accessed 15 June 2012.

17 *Ibid.*

18 In the media, the civil conflict in Sudan has often been dubbed as an example of the first ‘climate war’

19 All interviewee were civil servants and thus had a high level of general policy awareness.

20 European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Water Management in Developing Countries Policy and Priorities for EU Development Cooperation {SEC(2002)288}*, 2002,  
[http://eur-](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2002&nu_doc=132)

[lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga\\_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type\\_doc=COMfinal&an\\_doc=2002&nu\\_doc=132](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2002&nu_doc=132).

21 Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, *S113/08, Climate Change and International Security*, March 14, 2008 and the European External Action Service and European Commission, *Towards a Renewed and Strengthened EU Climate Diplomacy. Joint Reflection Paper.*, 09 2011,  
[http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/docs/2011\\_joint\\_paper\\_euclimate\\_diplomacy\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/docs/2011_joint_paper_euclimate_diplomacy_en.pdf) as well as the Council of the

Whilst most interviewees had a broad understanding of the concept of human security, there was no unanimity as to its meaning or as to how it was being tackled by the EU. Interpretations of human security varied from connecting it to vulnerability and environment, to placing it alongside traditional security. Mostly, interviewees connected the concept of human security to the EUs external rather than internal affairs.

Despite these differing definitions, a number of interviewees did agree that climate change and environmental factors can present risks for human security and conflict. One interviewee highlighted two particular constellations to be considered in regards to these interlinkages: firstly, the potential that water or lack of water has for causing human security issues, highlighted, for example, in the case of the Middle East; secondly, the potential that underlying problems could flare up and cause conflict over water.<sup>23</sup> The potential for climate- or conflict-induced migration was also mentioned by a few interviewees. However, as expressed by one interviewee, the causal relationship between climate change and migration is difficult to demonstrate, as water scarcity or other climatic factors are only some of a number of reasons why people choose to migrate.<sup>24</sup> Although migration is recognised as both a strategy for adapting to climate change or indeed as a response to threats to human security or conflict, ensuring populations have stable, viable environments to live, in their own countries wherever possible, was said to be the EUs preferred option.<sup>25</sup>

#### **4. Overview of policy framework**

The following chapter aims to provide a broad overview of EU level policies which address climate change, water and human security.<sup>26</sup> It distinguishes between ‘internal’ policies (made by the EU for its MS); ‘regional’ policies (EU level interaction at the Mediterranean and European Neighbourhood level)<sup>27</sup>; and international cooperation with third countries and the UN.

The EU is well known for its leadership in environmental protection and policy-making. It further has a strong policy framework in the water sector – at least as far as water quality is concerned - and has been bold in its initiatives to address climate change

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European Union, “Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy”, 2011 were all highlighted by different interviewees as key documents addressing the connection between human security, climate change and the environment.

<sup>22</sup> EU states have sought to increase visibility of these issues at international level. Two examples are the Greek chairmanship of the Human Security Network in 2008, which focused on raising political and public awareness on the human security implications of climate change, and the German chairmanship of the Security Council in 2011 which focused on the threats that climate change poses for security.

<sup>23</sup> Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment

<sup>24</sup> Personal communication, Maria-Cruz Cristobal Muñoz, European External Action Service

<sup>25</sup> Personal communication, European Union official working on environment and climate issues

<sup>26</sup> For a full discussion of the relevant EU policy framework, please see Elizabeth Tedsen, *CLICO Working Paper: Climate Adaptation, Water and Security at the International Level: Overview of European Union and United Nations Initiatives*, 2012, <http://clico.org/working-papers>.

<sup>27</sup> For an overview of the European Neighbourhood region see Annex II

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mitigation. Measures to address adaptation to climate change are receiving increasing attention. However in contrast to mitigation, this is a policy area which is still very much in the process of development and which due to its cross-cutting nature is addressed in different ways by different Directorates General (DGs) of the European Commission.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, although the impacts of climate change on oceans and hydrological resources are increasingly understood, methods and approaches for MS and citizens to adapt to changing climatic conditions and sea-level rise are only beginning to be systematised. The EU has no overarching strategy or policy that addresses climate change, water and the potential implications for human security or conflict. However, as this section shows, there are a number of initiatives which take aspects of this nexus into account.

#### **4.1 Internal policies**

The EU has a long history of policy-making in the area of water management and protection. This contributes to overall high levels of water security. As noted above, conflict over water within the EU is limited and its water management policies promote inter-regional and cross-border cooperation in water management (including droughts and floods) and risk assessment, including the establishment of trans-boundary risk maps and flood mitigation strategies.<sup>29</sup>

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) (2000) forms the primary legal framework for the management of EU waters.<sup>30</sup> The WFD is primarily focused on water quality rather than quantity and the EU policy framework does remain underdeveloped in the management of water quantity.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, good water quality does make a key contribution to human security by ensuring water security and health for human populations. The key tools created pursuant to the WFD are River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) which decentralise the management of water resources to the river basin level and which require cooperation between riparian states. The implementation of the WFD takes place through a framework for cooperation and coordination on water management known as the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS). As part of this Implementation Strategy, a number of working groups and expert groups have been set up, which include an expert group on Climate Change and Water and another on Water Scarcity and Droughts. Measures to tackle floods are of crucial importance for protecting citizens and ensuring human security. To this end, the WFD is complemented by the Floods Directive (2007) which provides a framework for reducing and managing flood

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28 See Annex I for a glossary of the main EU institutions and policy-making instruments of relevance to this study.

29 EIB, *Financing Water and Climate Change Adaptation*, March 31, 2012.

30 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council, *Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy*, 2000, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:327:0001:0072:EN:PDF>.

31 A contributing factor to this is that the quantitative management of water resources is one of the few areas of environmental decision-making requiring unanimous agreement amongst Member States rather than a majority vote.

risk, through hazard mapping and the preparation of flood risk management plans by 2015.<sup>32</sup> The European Environment Agency (EEA) is also supporting the first preliminary flood risk mapping to contribute to the European Water Information System for Europe (WISE).<sup>33</sup> Challenges associated with reduced water availability (and therefore water and human security) are also addressed by the 2007 European Commission Communication on Water Scarcity and Droughts<sup>34</sup> and are regularly assessed through annual Follow-up Reports.<sup>35</sup>

The Commission's Communication on Droughts and Water Scarcity and its Follow-up Reports also recognise the growing stress on water resources and the role that climate change plays in increasing this stress. In June 2010, the European Council adopted its own conclusions on water scarcity, drought and adaptation to climate change.<sup>36</sup> These conclusions recognised the serious and growing problems within Europe stemming from both natural and anthropogenic causes, stressed the importance of water management and planning, urged Member States to take action and invited the Commission to consider new measures where appropriate.

A substantial tranche of 20% of the EUs budget for 2014-2020 (the Multiannual Financial Framework) has been earmarked for climate change (both mitigation and adaptation); the first time that funds have been targeted in this way. All internal action on climate change is coordinated by DG CLIMA where activity on climate change adaptation is currently focused on the development of an adaptation strategy to be implemented beginning in 2013, as proposed by the Commission's 2009 White Paper on climate change adaptation.<sup>37</sup> The final details of this adaptation strategy are yet to be finalised, however, the framework is currently much 'softer' than that of mitigation as it does not include legally binding targets. The EUs focus is to mainstream climate change adaptation into different sectors and existing policy processes. Three sectoral papers accompanying the White Paper highlight the particular challenges for agriculture,<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the Assessment and Management of Flood Risks, 2007.

<sup>33</sup> The Water Information System for Europe (WISE) is a gateway to information on European water issues. It comprises a wide range of data and information collected by EU institutions to serve several stakeholders. <http://water.europa.eu/>

<sup>34</sup> European Commission, *Addressing the Challenge of Water Scarcity and Droughts in the European Union*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, July 18, 2007, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0414:EN:NOT>.

<sup>35</sup> See the three Follow-up Reports at: [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/quantity/eu\\_action.htm#2007\\_com](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/quantity/eu_action.htm#2007_com). Accessed 28 February 2012

<sup>36</sup> Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Water Scarcity, Drought and Adaptation to Climate Change," in *3021st Environment Council Meeting* (Luxembourg, 2010).

<sup>37</sup> European Commission, *White Paper: Adapting to Climate Change: Towards a European Framework for Action* (Brussels: European Commission, 2009), <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0147:FIN:EN:PDF>.

<sup>38</sup> European Commission, „Commission staff working document accompanying the White paper - Adapting to climate change : Towards a European framework for action Climate Change and Water, Coasts and Marine Issues {COM(2009) 147 final} {SEC(2009) 387} {SEC(2009) 388}“.

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health<sup>39</sup>, water, coasts and marine issues<sup>40</sup>. A new web portal CLIMATE-ADAPT was launched in 2012 to provide information on adaptation and to collect examples of policies and best-practice on adaptation across the EU.<sup>41</sup>

Action to adapt to climate induced impacts on water can be seen in several key policies. The Floods Directive states that preliminary flood risk assessments should include the potential adverse consequences of future floods for human health, the environment and economic activity and consider long-term developments including impacts of climate change. Flood management plans should be periodically reviewed and updated according to the likely impacts of climate change.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, the Common Implementation Strategy of the WFD foresees numerous ways in which climate change should be taken into account.<sup>43</sup> Beyond water policy, sectoral policies which impact water resources such as the EUs Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are now also placing emphasis on specific measures such as water saving technologies and flood prevention and management<sup>44</sup> and future plans to reform the CAP place an emphasis on food security, the environment and climate change.<sup>45</sup>

The Commission is currently undertaking a review of all water policy which aims to assess its capacity to address current and future challenges, which will include vulnerability and the ability to adapt to climate change. This review will feed into a proposal for a 'Blueprint for Safeguarding European Waters' to be proposed at the end of 2012 and will specifically address issues related to the implementation of the WFD and any shortcomings in terms of coordination with other sectors such as agriculture and concerns such as water quantity issues.<sup>46</sup> The EEA is also working on indicator and

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39 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the White Paper - Adapting to Climate Change : Towards a European Framework for Action Climate Change and Water, Coasts and Marine Issues {COM(2009) 147 Final} {SEC(2009) 387} {SEC(2009) 388}", n.d., <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2009:0386:FIN:EN:PDF>.

40 Ibid.

41 CLIMATE-ADAPT was not yet published at the time of interview. It is now online at: <http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/>

42 Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the Assessment and Management of Flood Risks, 60.

43 European Communities, "Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) Guidance No 24 - River Basin Management in a Changing Climate.", 2009, [http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/env/wfd/library?l=/framework\\_directive/guidance\\_documents/management\\_final\\_pdf/\\_EN\\_1.0\\_&a=d](http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/env/wfd/library?l=/framework_directive/guidance_documents/management_final_pdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d).

44 Council of the European Union, *Council Regulation (EC) No 74/2009 of 19 January 2009 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on Support for Rural Development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)*, January 19, 2009, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=487851:cs&lang=en&list=500157:cs,487851:cs,&pos=2&page=1&nbl=2&pgs=10&hwor ds=>.

45 European Commission, *The CAP Towards 2020: Meeting the Food, Natural Resources and Territorial Challenges of the Future*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Council, The European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, November 18, 2010).

46 The Blueprint is being produced on the basis of four main assessments: the assessment of the River Basin Management Plans delivered by the Member States under the Water Framework Directive; the review of the EU action on Water Scarcity and Drought; the assessment of the vulnerability of water resources to climate change and other

scenario development to show current and future impacts of climate change including those on water and health.

The White Paper on adaptation to climate change also points out that “failure to adapt could have security implications”.<sup>47</sup> With this aim in mind, the EU is working to strengthen its analysis and early warning systems and integrating climate change into existing tools such as conflict prevention mechanisms and security sector reform.<sup>48</sup> The White Paper further remarks that the effects of climate change on migratory flows should also be considered in the broader EU reflection on security, development and migration policies.

## **4.2 Regional policies**

As with its internal policies, the EUs regional policies do not directly tackle the connection between climate change, human security and conflict. Nevertheless, the EU contributes to numerous regional governance and development initiatives which tackle aspects of this nexus. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is one of the EUs key mechanisms for regional cooperation, carried out mainly through bilateral cooperation and informed by mutual commitment to common values.<sup>49</sup> The ENP has no overarching thematic focus on water management, human security or conflict prevention as agreements are drafted on a country to country basis. However, amongst other actions, the ENP does support partner countries to mainstream climate change into existing policies<sup>50</sup> as well as enhancing sectoral cooperation on environmental protection and improving resilience to climate impacts.<sup>51</sup>

The EU has several regional initiatives which are of relevance for cooperative, trans-boundary water management and protection in the Mediterranean. The EU Water Initiative (EUWI) and Horizon 2020 both contribute to human security in terms of their focus on health and water quality. EUWI has a development focus with the aim of improving water supply and sanitation in line with the Millennium Development Goals

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man made pressures and; the Fitness Check which will address the whole EU water policy in the framework of the Commission Better Regulation approach. A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Waters. European Commission. [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/blueprint/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/blueprint/index_en.htm). Accessed on 2 May 2012.

<sup>47</sup> European Commission, *White Paper: Adapting to Climate Change: Towards a European Framework for Action*.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> The recent ENP review, sets out a policy of ‘bilateral differentiation’ (‘more for more’) increasing the incentives (economic integration, mobility of people and financial assistance) for countries who share the EUs values on human rights, democracy and rule of law and are willing to embark on political reforms. In the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood, the EU has offered to engage in partnership dialogues on migration, mobility and security with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. European Commission, *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy*, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, May 25, 2011).

<sup>50</sup> European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 12 May 2010 - Taking Stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy [COM(2010) 207 Final - Not Published in the Official Journal].”, n.d., <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0207:FIN:EN:PDF>.

<sup>51</sup> High Representative and European Commission, “A New Response To A Changing Neighbourhood A Review Of European Neighbourhood Policy: Joint Communication by the High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European Commission. 25 May 2011.”, n.d., [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com\\_11\\_303\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf).

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(MDGs) and the Horizon 2020 initiative contributes to tackling pollution in the Mediterranean by implementing the commitments undertaken in the framework of the Barcelona Convention.<sup>52</sup> The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) aims for cooperative action in the sustainable management of water resources and the protection of their quality. The Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean (SWM) is being developed and worked upon with support from EUWI and the UfM. The SWM was designed to provide a common political, methodological, and financing framework for cooperation over water between southern and northern Mediterranean states and to facilitate the implementation of regional policies in the water field.<sup>53</sup>

In addition to cooperation over water, the SWM addresses the impacts that climate change may have for human health, food and water security. The Strategy furthermore includes ‘adapting to climate change and enhancing drought and flood management’ is one of the SWM’s four priority themes. In this way, if successful, the SWM could provide a number of benefits for adaptation to water related impacts of climate change, ensuring human security and reduction of conflict potential in the region. Nevertheless, to date the SWM has not been adopted due to political differences over the wording of the document.<sup>54</sup>

The EUWI website clearly notes that “the numbers of those forced to emigrate by drought and climate change climb every year”<sup>55</sup> and the relevance of climate induced impacts for migration, and consequently elements of human security has entered into EU level discussions and policy documents. The 2009 Stockholm Programme to address future challenges in the area of freedom, security and justice requested an exploration of the effects of climate change on international migration and potential effects on immigration to the EU.<sup>56</sup> Following renewed attention brought by the Arab spring in 2011<sup>57</sup>, the EU proposed an overarching framework for EU External Migration Policy, known as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). The GAMM is to be embedded in the EU’s overall foreign and development policy and aligned with the EU’s internal policy priorities. The GAMM considers that addressing environmentally induced migration, including by means of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, is

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52 Horizon 2020 website: <http://www.h2020.net/>

53 As a response to the water problems in the region the significant water problems (water scarcity, droughts) in the region and the implications they have on livelihoods, it was decided at the 2008 Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Water (22 December 2008, Dead Sea, Jordan) to elaborate a new long term Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean. For details, see Bergland, M., *European Policies Regarding Water Policy, Climate Change and Security in the MENA*, 2011.

54 Israel blocks Mediterranean water strategy. Global Water Intelligence, “Israel Blocks Mediterranean Water Strategy,” *Global Water Intelligence*, April 2010, <http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/11/4/general/israel-blocks-mediterranean-water-strategy.html>.

55 EU Water Initiative. <http://euwi.net/about-euwi>. Accessed 27 February 2012.

56 “The Stockholm Programme-An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens” (Brussels, 2009), [http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/download.action;jsessionid=wyLKQ3fX968fQWpJC4X12htlLnxfFj57pNLYB19v4kMWvS0yQhn3!-186574361?nodeId=ed45de55-a7f6-4662-8773-efc6c89df8ea&fileName=The+Stockholm\\_Programme+-+an+open+and+secure+Europe\\_en.pdf&fileType=pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/download.action;jsessionid=wyLKQ3fX968fQWpJC4X12htlLnxfFj57pNLYB19v4kMWvS0yQhn3!-186574361?nodeId=ed45de55-a7f6-4662-8773-efc6c89df8ea&fileName=The+Stockholm_Programme+-+an+open+and+secure+Europe_en.pdf&fileType=pdf).

57 European Commission, “A Win-Win Immigration Policy” (European Commission, November 21, 2011), [http://ec.europa.eu/news/external\\_relations/111121\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/news/external_relations/111121_en.htm).

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part of its approach.<sup>58</sup> Although human security is not mentioned specifically, the GAMM does take a migrant-centred approach to the design of policies in order that these respond to the aspirations and problems of the people concerned. In addition, migration and mobility are said to be embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context and the GAMM recognises the need to accompany and protect migrants along their migratory route.

Coordination on climate change with third countries is carried out through three main institutions: DG CLIMA, DG DEVCO and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS has recently put together a climate change team who will follow the security aspects of climate change so as to provide a more systematised approach that avoids the previous 'ping-ponging' back and forth between the two bodies.<sup>59</sup> DG CLIMA is working closely with the EEAS as well as with the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG Echo) on a disaster risk reduction strategy in response to Member State requests to produce an overview of future climate change risks. The timing of this strategy is being closely coordinated with the Adaptation strategy and will be released at the same time at the beginning of 2013.

#### **Box 1: The European Investment Bank**

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is an investment bank which funds activities both within and outside the EU. In 2011, the EIB signed loan agreements worth EUR 61bn, of which EUR 54bn was in the EU.<sup>60</sup> The EIBs Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) specifically supports growth and job creation by improving infrastructure including in the environmental sector in water and sanitation, solid waste disposal and treatment, pollution abatement and irrigation. The EIB is driven by EU policy and as such, the White Paper on climate adaptation has been an important driver for the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into EIB projects.<sup>61</sup> Climate vulnerability is a transversal issue which is built into all of the Bank's sector policies. Its approach to adaptation is to eliminate the risk of climate change by considering the potential impacts and ways in which these could be mitigated. The vulnerability of the project (i.e. the way in which climate change can impact the project) as well as the vulnerability of the environment (i.e. the way in which the project can impact the climate vulnerability of the environment) were both considered important aspects to consider in appraisal for funding.<sup>62</sup>

58 European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility {COM(2011)0743 Final}", n.d., <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0743:FIN:EN:PDF>.

59 Personal communication, European Union official working on environment and climate issues

60 European Investment Bank, *Financial Report 2011*, 2011, <http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/financial-report-2011.htm>.

61 Personal communication, Mathias Zoellner, European Investment Bank.

62 Personal communication, Mathias Zoellner, European Investment Bank.

The EIB is also the largest source of loan finance to the global water sector to date<sup>63</sup> and has identified integrated water resource management and adaptation to climate change as key objectives for future lending operations.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, the Bank recognises that anticipatory and precautionary adaptation to the consequences of climate change is more effective and less costly than forced, last-minute emergency action, and therefore focuses its water sector investments on the preservation of freshwater resources, sustainable water management, protection of marine and coastal zones and other adaptive measures.<sup>65</sup> The EIB also provides feedback to the EU on implementation of tools such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments to assist with improving guidelines, and it helps to disseminate good practice developed in the EU, for example through the publication of the 2007 EIB flood risk management guide.<sup>66</sup>

Some activities supported by the EIB such as natural resource extraction or the construction of hydro-electric dams have the potential to create negative outcomes should they fail to take existing conflicts or fragilities into account. The EIB has a set of environmental and social guidelines which recognise the potential risk and impacts to be greater in projects located in conflict and post-conflict areas, or in areas subject to significant natural or manmade events (e.g. areas subject to seismic events, flooding).<sup>67</sup> The guidelines furthermore seek to safeguard human security considerations by creating a responsibility of the project promoter to identify and to avoid or minimise the risks and adverse impacts to community health, safety and security that may arise from project activities.. The interviewee noted that at the core, the EIBs focus is on the financing of sound investments and to minimise risks - including those induced by climate change - to these investments as well as to the environment.

### **4.3 Cooperation with third countries**

Beyond its internal policies and cooperation with non-MS in the Mediterranean region, the EU also supports numerous activities in the Sahel region and beyond. The EU is the world's largest provider of official development assistance<sup>68</sup> and provides substantial additional financial support through other sources such as the European Investment Bank (see Box 1). Most cooperation with third countries takes place through bilateral agreements usually developed as 'country strategy papers' although the EU also contributes to regional initiatives. The EU supports water management through initiatives such as the ACP-EU Water Facility<sup>69</sup> and requires climate change

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63 EIB, *The European Investment Bank in the Water Sector: Financing Water Supply, Sanitation and Flood Protection*, May 3, 2012. As compared to other International Financial Institutions.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 EIB, "EIB Flood Risk Management Guide", February 18, 2008, <http://www.eib.org/projects/publications/eib-flood-risk-management-guide.htm>.

67 European Investment Bank, *Environmental and Social Practices Handbook*, 2010.

68 Europe Aid, "The European Consensus On Development" (Official Journal of the European Union, February 24, 2006), [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european\\_consensus\\_2005\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf).

69 Europe Aid, "ACP-EU Water Facility", n.d., [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/water/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/water/index_en.htm).

considerations to be incorporated in all aspects of EU development cooperation work.<sup>70</sup> To this end, the EU has also established, amongst other measures, the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), which seeks to enhance support for adaptation to climate change for less-developed and vulnerable states.<sup>71</sup> The Commission has also shown the need to support disaster risk reduction as part of the strategy for adaptation to climate change in developing countries beyond the European neighbourhood.<sup>72</sup>

Since 2001,<sup>73</sup> EU external policy activity has intermittently involved itself with the potential impacts of climate change on human security. Interest in this topic has come through in the European Security Strategy<sup>74</sup>, but the most concrete summary of the EUs concerns and proposals for action on this subject are from 2008 in the document known as the Solana paper<sup>75</sup> and the High Representative's recommendations on climate change and security.<sup>76</sup> In 2011, a Joint Reflection Paper of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission noted the role of climate change as a global environmental and development challenge and as a 'threat multiplier'<sup>77</sup> and the Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy also recognised the need to 'reduce systematic risks resulting from climate change before they trigger crises.'<sup>78</sup> The EUs 'Agenda for Change' also proposed in 2011 sets out a strategic approach for aid focused on sectors to provide a basis for inclusive and sustainable growth, including sustainable agriculture, helping to provide safeguards against external shocks and turn challenges of food security and climate change into opportunities for growth.<sup>79</sup> However as yet, no concrete policy or approach has been adopted which suggests how the EU should address climate related impacts on water, human security and conflict in third countries in a comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, these issues have not been neglected as

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70 European Commission, "Climate Change in the Context of Development", March 11, 2003.

71 "Global Climate Change Alliance", February 28, 2012, [http://www.gcca.eu/pages/1\\_2-Home.html](http://www.gcca.eu/pages/1_2-Home.html).

72 European Commission, *EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, February 23, 2009, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0084:FIN:EN:PDF>. COM(2009)82

73 In 2001, the European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, April 11, 2001, [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis\\_management/docs/com2001\\_211\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis_management/docs/com2001_211_en.pdf). identified natural resources and environmental degradation as cross-cutting issues with climate change potentially having a destabilising effect on agriculture, economy and migration.

74 *A Secure Europe in a Better World*; European Security Strategy (Brussels, December 12, 2003). and *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy- Providing Security in a Changing World* (Brussels, December 11, 2008).

75 Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, *S113/08, Climate Change and International Security*.

76 High Representative, "Climate Change and Security: Recommendations of the High Representative on Follow-up to the High Representative and Commission Report on Climate Change and International Security (S412/08)18 December 2008", n.d., <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/st16994.en08.pdf>.

77 European External Action Service and European Commission, *Towards a Renewed and Strengthened EU Climate Diplomacy. Joint Reflection Paper*.

78 Foreign Affairs Council, "Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy 3106th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Brussels, 18 July 2011", n.d., [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123923.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123923.pdf).

79 European Commission, *Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2011.

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several recent developments show. For example, the release of the strategy for security in the Sahel which takes a more comprehensive approach to security issues, including climate change and human security in late 2011<sup>80</sup> and a meeting in October 2011 of the Informal Steering Group on climate change and international security comprised of MS and representatives from EU institutions to take stock of the current state of play in EU climate diplomacy and explore options for the way forward, based on the Council conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy.<sup>81</sup> Finally, in June 2012, a draft report was compiled by the EPs Foreign Affairs Committee on the subject of Common Security and Defence Policy in the case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters.<sup>82</sup>

## 5. Effectiveness of current policy framework

The following section looks at interviewees' perceptions of the effectiveness of the EUs current policy framework for adapting to water related impacts of climate change and the potential implications for human security and conflict both within and beyond the EU. In line with our definition of 'policy framework' outlined in the introduction to this case study and the main report, this section not only covers the effectiveness of the policies for dealing with the issues they target, but also the effectiveness of the mechanisms for adopting and coordinating these policies.

### 5.1 Internal policies

Several interviewees from the Commission remarked upon the earmarking of funds for climate change in the 2014-20 budget as a demonstration of the EUs continued commitment to tackling climate change. However, in terms of high level political attention and effort on climate change, it has been mitigation (rather than adaptation) which has taken centre stage as a priority concern. In some cases, this focus may have even led to a 'crowding out' of other issues of relevance e.g. soil, sustainable land management, or food security.<sup>83</sup> Climate change adaptation has also had a lower level of political attention and is at a comparatively much earlier stage of development than mitigation. There was consensus amongst interviewees that more must be done regarding adaptation, both in terms of sharing information on existing measures in Member States as well as promoting and developing adequate response measures within the EU. One action being taken on this is the feeding of best-practice into the clearinghouse mechanism on adaptation through the CLIMATE-ADAPT web portal.<sup>84</sup> One hurdle to populating this portal however, may be the difficulty in identifying all actions which count as adaptation actions due to the fact that they vary according to local circumstances and the sectors in which they take place. One interviewee noted that although there are an increasing number of projects which indirectly address climate change adaptation, e.g. tackling floods as well as droughts or heat waves, the concept of

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80 European Union External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel", 2011, [http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf).

81 Foreign Affairs Council, "Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy 3106th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Brussels, 18 July 2011."

82 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Draft Report on the Role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in the Case of Climate-driven Crises and Natural Disasters, 2012/2095(INI)*, 2012.

adaptation has also not yet been well defined within regional funds<sup>85</sup>, meaning that projects and measures which can be counted as adaptation and can therefore be funded still need to be identified.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, the approach towards adaptation does not involve the legally binding targets of climate mitigation or indeed water policy and it is not clear whether the 'soft' policy approach that has been taken towards adaptation,

Members of DG DEVCO remarked that they did not have sufficient figures or indicators on floods and droughts in countries outside the EU to be able to implement actual changes in development cooperation activities and programmes. It was felt that improved guidelines on climate change adaptation were necessary to bridge the gap between on the one hand, an understanding the importance of adaptation to climate change, and on the other hand actually understanding how to operationalise this in their work, particularly when faced with a lack of data on climate impacts.<sup>87</sup>

The EU has already recognised the need to assess the effectiveness of its water policy and as noted above is undertaking a full review which will lead to the proposal of a 'Blueprint for Safeguarding European Waters' at the end of 2012. In the meantime, insights were shared by interviewees with regards to the effectiveness of current water policies. The WFD allows River Basin Authorities to develop RBMPs themselves, meaning that management practices and coordination with different actors and sectors can vary between river basins. It was highlighted that water and environmental policy in general cannot be effective if these are not integrated into activities and policies in other sectors, but yet RBMPs are not always well coordinated with other plans for agricultural or land use and can be detached from other sectoral drivers of water use or pollution.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, although MS are beginning to develop drought management plans and trying to establish risk preparedness measures this is still in the very early stages and is not yet integrated into or synchronised with RBMPs.<sup>89</sup> Finally a major drawback identified in the WFD is that it does not oblige river basins to deal with water quantity issues and as such there is nothing to stop a river basin from systematically over delivering water over a long period of time, with all of the consequences this may have.<sup>90</sup>

## **5.2 Regional policies**

The EU has a strong environmental framework and high level of implementation and support from its MS which can facilitate and have a positive influence on environmental policy development in neighboring states. This influence has been particularly strong in

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83 Personal communication, EU official working on environment and climate issues

84 CLIMATE-ADAPT was not yet published at the time of interview. It is now online at: <http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/>

85 The EU disposes of several regional financial instruments including the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund.

86 Personal communication, European Union official working on environment and climate issues

87 Personal communication European Union official working on water issues

88 Personal communication, European Union official working on water issues.

89 Personal communication, European Union official working on water issues

90 Personal communication, European Union official working on water issues

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the case of countries joining the EU under the enlargement process.<sup>91</sup> An interviewee from DG Environment found the enlargement process to be a positive and structured policy process which led to acceding governments' recognition of the value of environmental issues, thus in the interviewee's opinion, making it a more successful initiative than 'softer' processes such as Agenda 21.<sup>92</sup> In this way, the EU's internal policies can have a wider effect on the wider European Neighbourhood region: the interviewee also remarked that although there was room for improvement on environmental management, there is now a lower tendency for neighbouring states to dismiss environmental protection than was commonplace a decade ago and thus mainstreaming of climate and environmental concerns would not meet with the same level of institutional barriers.<sup>93</sup>

Cooperation under the ENP has tended to address more traditional water management challenges such as water quality and water pollution. However, similarly to EU internal policy, one EU official felt that drought needed to be further considered in future ENP projects and programming, as well as further thought given to the links between water and climate change adaptation.<sup>94</sup> One interviewee working in the European Parliament noted that in the recent review of the ENP, a more strategic overview was visible with an analysis and understanding of where and how the EU can apply its range of budgets and policy instruments.<sup>95</sup> One example is the decision that ENP Action Plans and EU assistance should be focused on a smaller number of priorities, backed with more precise benchmarks.<sup>96</sup> A further EU official from DG DEVCO cited the conflicts in the Middle East and in the Nile basin as contributing to the stalling of progress on water management, highlighting the need for transboundary cooperation to achieve successful Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM).<sup>97</sup> According to another interviewee, river conventions, such as the Danube and Rhine conventions, are settings where regional cooperation has proven successful and can be driven forward.<sup>98</sup> It was emphasised that the key features of success in this type of cooperation are for water management to take place at the local and operational level and to and should bring together stakeholders around a river or catchment area.<sup>99</sup>

Although the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean (SWM) present the potential for cooperation on climate change, water and human security issues, an interviewee from DG Environment working on this issue also felt that from these countries there was little will to move ahead and the chances of reaching a high-level regional agreement on any of these issues are 'probably close to 0 at the moment', meaning that the EU must work with regional mandates which are now

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91 Under the enlargement process of the last 50 years the EU has extended its number of MS to 27. In order to join, countries must adopt the body of EU rules known as the *acquis communautaire*. Those joining latterly have had to adopt the high percentage of environmental legislation included in the *acquis* in order to accede to the EU.

92 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment.

93 Ibid.

94 Personal communication, European Union official working on environment and climate issues

95 Personal communication, Gerard Quille, DG External Policies of the Union

96 European Commission, *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy*.

97 Personal communication, European Union official working on development issues

98 Personal communication, European Union official working on water issues

99 Ibid.

4-5 years old.<sup>100</sup> The interviewee noted that most countries are content for support to flow through bilateral mechanisms and to cooperate at the project level, such as through Horizon 2020 which is proving effective in improving environmental governance. The interviewee felt that countries did not see any additional benefits of pushing for regional cooperation on the SWM to continue after the stagnation in discussions.<sup>101</sup>

Work from Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) on trans-boundary river basin management was also seen to be effective, with the work carried out by the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) on the Danube cited as an example.<sup>102</sup> An interviewee from DG Environment also highlighted the Friends of the Earth Middle East's 'Good Water Neighbours'<sup>103</sup> project (supported by the EUs Partnership for Peace<sup>104</sup>) which has been effective in dampening community tensions through cooperation over joint water management. Some interviewees also highlighted how civil society actors and NGOs had a positive influence on moving cooperation forward in post-conflict situations especially where their lack of political affiliation may allow them to initiate cooperation or reconciliation. Nonetheless, these may also bring the potential to enflame political tensions (e.g. accusations of undermining the peace process through support for one NGO over another).<sup>105</sup>

### **5.3 Cooperation with third countries**

Outside the European Neighbourhood, the EUs work within bi-lateral programmes may often focus on 'traditional development' activities highlighted as necessary by the countries in question. These may tend to focus on areas such as poverty reduction and economic growth rather than environmental or climate change concerns. However, in agreement with the EUs commitment to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action<sup>106</sup>, strategies must be developed in accordance with the wishes and needs as determined by the recipient country, meaning that even if the EUs interests diverge from those of the recipient country, it cannot overtly force its own interests to be included in their policies and programmes. Nonetheless, one interviewee noted that there is an increasing interest in climate change adaptation from non-EU countries as a politically attractive concept which, in contrast to mitigation, does not require a level of acceptance of responsibility for climate change.<sup>107</sup> Specific initiatives referenced included the Great Green Wall Project, referred to for its activities connected to reforestation and water for the Sahara and the Sahel<sup>108</sup>, and the Global Climate Change Alliance<sup>109</sup>, for its protection

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100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Friends of the Earth Middle East, "Good Water Neighbours Project."

104 [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/documents/news/20120504\\_pfppataglance\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/documents/news/20120504_pfppataglance_en.pdf)

105 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment

106 OECD, "The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008)", 2008, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf>. highlight five fundamental principles for making aid more effective: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results-orientation, and mutual accountability of donors and recipients.

107 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment

108 See [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african\\_union/press\\_corner/all\\_news/news/2011/20110929\\_01\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african_union/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110929_01_en.htm)

109 See <http://www.gcca.eu/>

of human security through activities such as the building of a sea wall in Bangladesh.<sup>110</sup> Increasing funding for these activities may well further stimulate this interest and the part of the EUs 2014-20 budget earmarked for climate change (as discussed above) will include funding for development cooperation activities.

## **5.4 Summary**

Overall, interviewees at EU level appeared generally satisfied with the effectiveness of the policy framework to tackle the individual issues of water, climate change and human security, albeit implicitly in the case of the latter.<sup>111</sup> Internally, there has been a historic focus on climate change mitigation, at times to the detriment of other areas such as agriculture, biodiversity and indeed, climate change adaptation. The need for developing, identifying projects and sharing information with regards to climate change adaptation was still perceived to be lacking and necessary. Water policy was found to be wanting in terms of its consideration of drought, its integration with other sectors and the potential it created for overdelivering water beyond sustainable levels. The review of the EUs current water policy to produce the so called 'Blueprint' is now a key focus and seen as an opportunity to improve performance in these areas. Regionally speaking, the EU can be effective in driving environmental policy and there is generally an acceptance and willingness to work on these issues. Transboundary cooperation has been successful in the case of the Danube and the Rhine, and NGOs are usually an effective actor in these situations, especially where potential conflict is present. In contrast, over-politicisation of water management issues – as with the Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean – can create stumbling blocks for even seemingly well-drafted technical policies. Whilst the EU has developed useful policies to address the issues of water and climate change which were perceived to be broadly going in the right direction, its approach to human security and conflict is less explicit and thus more difficult to comment on its effectiveness. Furthermore although developments continue, there are as yet no policies which address water, climate change adaptation, human security concerns and conflict in an integrated way.

## **6. Factors impacting the effectiveness of the EU policy framework**

The previous section has examined the effectiveness of the EUs current policy framework is for addressing the issues of water, climate change and human security. The following section considers the factors which facilitate or present barriers to the effectiveness of this policy framework through the use of a policy cycle lens, (looking at agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation).

### **6.1 Facilitating factors**

The EU is able to set agendas and create policies which are legally binding and require action from all its MS. Such action is visible for example in its Directives on flood

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<sup>110</sup> Personal communication, European Union official working on environment and climate issues

<sup>111</sup> It should be noted that all EU level interviewees were civil servants working at EU institutions which may lead their overall assessment to be more positive than if other persons had been interviewed.

protection and water quality and in climate change mitigation. Interviewees noted that strong EU environmental policies have also helped to impact and influence environmental policies in countries that neighbour the EU in a positive way. Javier Solana, as High Representative for the Comm

on Foreign and Security Policy from 1999-2009, was also able to increase awareness on concept of human security as evident from various documents, most notably the 'Barcelona Report' (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe).<sup>112</sup> Interest in drawing attention to the links between climate change and security has also been demonstrated by some national players, including Germany, Portugal, and the UK, who have been very active on this front and were seen to be keen to drive this agenda forward.<sup>113</sup> In addition, despite its lack of concrete policies concerning human security, the EU was seen by one interviewee to be very active in developing its practical application, more so than other actors which were more explicit on this issue such as the UN.<sup>114</sup>

Although there are unavoidable difficulties associated with coordination between the numerous DGs and staff members of the Commission, there is, generally speaking a strong level of cooperation and communication between the branches of the European civil service. As mentioned by previously, interviewees highlighted specific efforts to systematise coordination on climate change with third countries between DG DEVCO, DG CLIMA, and the EEAS. The latter two are also working closely with DG ECHO on a disaster risk reduction strategy which is being timed and coordinated closely with the Climate Adaptation strategy to be released in 2013.

## **6.2 Barriers and challenges for effectiveness**

Despite a certain high level political interest to set a human security agenda which connects to climate change, and the creation of various positioning documents, there appears to be little will or movement towards developing actual policies to address the inter-linkages between climate change impacts on water, human security and conflict. An interviewee from DG Environment noted the issue stagnated following a power struggle between the Council and the Commission regarding who had competence for

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112 Mary Kaldor et al. *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*, The Barcelona Report (Barcelona, September 15, 2004). The Barcelona Report presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana represents the first coherent attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on individual rights to security—not only in terms of policy and legal principles but also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration Janne Haaland Matlary, "Much Ado About Little: The EU and Human Security," *International Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2008): 131–143. and makes the case for creating a 15,000 strong civilian populated "Human Security Response Force" and a "Human Security Volunteer Service".

113 Germany's 2011 presidency of the UN Security Council for example highlighted the issues of climate change and security, dealing with sea level rise and food security.

114 Personal communication, Maria C. C. Munoz: European External Action Service

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the issue of climate change, migration and human security and whether it should be taken up as a common foreign and security issue or as an environmental issue.<sup>115</sup>

Even within the Commission itself, overall responsibility for human security and conflict and the connection to water and climate change is unclear. Neither interviewees from DG Environment nor from DG CLIMA perceived the nexus between water, climate, human security and conflict to be within their area of competence. This combination of issues was above all seen as an ‘external’ issue under the competence of the EEAS and DG DEVCO. Despite this perception however, neither interviewees from the EEAS nor from DG DEVCO mentioned proposals for addressing the water, conflict or human security related impacts of climate change, nor foresaw explicit policies being developed in the future. The EEAS is currently seen to be experiencing ‘teething troubles’ – initial issues of capacity, staffing, and meeting expectations – which may explain why this coordination is not currently taking place.<sup>116</sup> Nonetheless, a lack of clarity regarding competence for these issues remains. This may however have less to do with the issue itself, but rather with the general nature of mainstreaming cross-cutting themes.

The competence for climate change was separated from DG Environment in 2010 and placed within the purpose-created DG CLIMA. As described above, the EU has taken a mainstreaming approach to the implementation of climate change adaptation.<sup>117</sup> This policy approach means that although DG CLIMA has the overarching responsibility for this issue, close cooperation with other DGs is required to ensure adaptation is reflected in all sectors. One interviewee defined the creation of DG CLIMA as useful for bringing climate issues together ‘under one roof’ but at the same time somewhat artificial<sup>118</sup>; although cooperation across the Commission is in general frequent and fluid, in some cases there have been differences of opinion regarding which DG has competence on issues such as adaptation in the water sector. Furthermore, identifying how and where mainstreamed concepts are being addressed is not always obvious. An interviewee from the EP noted that because the concepts of climate change adaptation and human security are treated as cross-cutting issues, it can be difficult to see exactly how these

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115 Ibid.

116 The European External Action Service (EEAS) was created in December 2010 and is responsible for the implementation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the coordination of the EU's delegations which carry out diplomatic operations across the world. It is independent from other EU institutions (e.g. the Commission, the Parliament and the Council) and is headed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (currently Baroness Catherine Ashton). An interviewee from DG Environment remarked that the precursor to the EEAS, DG Relex (Directorate-General for the External Relations) had previously taken on a useful coordination role to move the Commission forward on common external policy goals but that this role was no longer so obvious and communication has become more difficult with the EEAS (although due to historic staff relationships, current cooperation with the EEAS was still viewed as acceptable).

117 For more details on a mainstreaming approach to climate change adaptation, see Gerstetter et al., forthcoming 2012.

118 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment

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are being integrated into policy and what concrete measures and activities are being implemented.

A further hindering factor to creating a coherent and integrated policy framework is that as individual issues, the topics of climate change, water, human security and conflict are also politically sensitive. For example, an interviewee from DG Environment remarked that due to a historical lack of cooperation between many countries in the southern Mediterranean, cooperation on water was something of a 'difficult topic'.<sup>119</sup> This was demonstrated in recent efforts at policy cooperation under the Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean where an otherwise technically well-formulated agreement for cooperation on water (which included human security aspects) became politicised, resulting in an overall blocking of the process. There may be also be resistance from non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region to engage on human security, as the dominant interpretation of security is often still national or militaristic<sup>120</sup> and may potentially be seen as posing a threat to state sovereignty.<sup>121</sup>

When the cross-cutting issue of climate change adaptation (competence of DG CLIMA) is combined with water (competence of DG Environment) as well as human security and conflict, it can present further challenges: the interlinkages between these issues are complex both at a conceptual level and at a practical level for defining which DGs should be responsible for policy formulation and implementation. This complexity may further increase when formulating and implementing measures which attempt to deal with entire regions such as the Mediterranean.<sup>122</sup> However, there is a disconnect between the need to address this complexity and the day-to-day work of policy makers. One interviewee remarked that policy makers are focused on how concepts can be operationalised at a practical level through policy, programmes and projects rather than conceptual or academic debates.<sup>123</sup> In this way, although interviewees understood there to be a general EU-level awareness of the potential connections between climate change, water, human security and conflict, there was seen to be the need both for 'champions' who would push for this to become an agenda priority, and for concrete guidelines or proposals on the technicalities of mainstreaming issues such as climate adaptation as well as addressing its interconnection with water, human security and conflict in a holistic and interconnected manner.

In addition to the lack of clarity regarding which EU institution should lead action on these issues, it was also noted that the UN is already significantly involved in initiatives relating to the subject of human security and conflict such as the Environment and

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119 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment

120 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment.

121 Personal communication, European Union official working on environment and climate issues

122 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment

123 Personal communication, Gerard Quille, DG External Policies of the Union

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Security initiative – ENVSEC.<sup>124</sup> Indeed, the UN has a range of programmes which contribute to the agenda of human security and conflict prevention.<sup>125</sup> One interviewee felt that there was ‘little room’ on this ‘wagon’ for the Commission which has instead tended to observe the debate on human security at a distance rather than become involved in the geopolitical aspects of the debate.<sup>126</sup>

### **6.3 Summary**

The EU is able to set agendas and create policies which are legally binding and require action from all its MS. Notwithstanding the size and scope of the EU, a high level of cooperation and communication exists between and within its institutions. However, several challenges were highlighted which have implications for the effectiveness of the current policy framework on climate induced impacts on water, human security and conflict. There have in the past been a number of high level statements and initiatives to move the question of human security as well as its links to climate change forward. This agenda was driven forward by key individuals such as the High Representative Javier Solana. After leaving office, there has been less noticeable focus on this issue, which may have led to other agenda issues becoming more prominent. In terms of implementation, it was noted also that the EU contributed to the practical application of adaptation and human security. However, the current approach is does not deal with these issues in an explicit and interconnected way, meaning that identifying such actions is a challenging process.

Overall there appears to be little will to make the policy framework more tangible and explicit which could affect its overall effectiveness, or at least the ability to assess its effectiveness. This lack of will may be for a number of reasons, amongst which are that even individually, climate change, water, human security and conflict can be politically sensitive or ‘difficult’ topics especially between actors where there is a history of conflict. In addition, Commission officials are usually focused on the practicalities of day-to-day work with little time available to engage in broad conceptual debates such as human security. Although this is understandable, the lack of an explicit policy framework means that there is no actor which is obviously in charge of coordinating these activities and driving the policy process forward which may impact the overall effectiveness of the framework. Finally, a further explanation for the EUs more reserved role may be that the UN was already seen to be in the leading role on the subject of

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124 The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) is a partnership of six international organizations whose mission is to contribute to the reduction of environment and security risks through strengthened cooperation among and within countries in four regions: Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, and South-Eastern Europe. [http://www.envsec.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=60&lang=en](http://www.envsec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=60&lang=en) Accessed 15 June 2012.

125 For full details of these programmes, see Tedsen, *CLICO Working Paper: Climate Adaptation, Water and Security at the International Level: Overview of European Union and United Nations Initiatives*.

126 Personal communication, Andrew Murphy, DG Environment

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human security and is already at the head of concrete initiatives to link this to environmental and wider impacts such as through ENVSEC.

## **7. Future perspectives on the policy framework**

This section details future perspectives on the policy framework shared by the interviewees. It includes expectations regarding the development of the framework and, where these were voiced, their demands in this regard. Overall, interviewee recommendations were focused on ways to improve the existing policy framework and rather than in relation to a need for developing new policies. Although as noted above there has been some discussion of the connections between the impacts of climate change and human security, interviewees did not expect policies addressing this interlinkage to be developed in the near future.<sup>127</sup> If such policies were to be developed, the need was perceived to clarify which parts of the EU and the Commission in particular would be responsible for developing this framework. Future insights on specific issues are grouped under the sections that follow.

### **7.1 Review and development of existing policies**

Interviewees identified a need for increasing attention and awareness of climate change adaptation (as opposed to mitigation) beyond the strategic policy level within the Commission, to improve action on implementation. The EU's policy framework for adaptation is still in process and interviewees preferred withhold judgment to see how new measures such as the European Climate Adaptation Platform: CLIMATE-ADAPT, would perform once fully completed, rather than requesting additional new measures. Many interviewees saw CLIMATE-ADAPT as a key tool that would provide an important possibility for lessons learned to be shared across the EU.<sup>128</sup> In a similar way, interviewees expected that the development of the Blueprint for Safeguarding European Waters, would lead to the creation of a more appropriate framework to deal with future challenges, including climate change but not specifically conflict or human security. Specifically, it was noted that the EU Climate Change and Water expert group set up under the WFDs Common Implementation Strategy hoped to see climate change vulnerability to be included in the EUs water policy, into the Floods Directive and/or the WFD.<sup>129</sup> An interviewee from the EP highlighted that many internal policies have an external dimension and impact, and that it would be useful to examine these policies for complementarities with more classic external relations and foreign policy.

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<sup>127</sup> Interestingly, since the conclusion of these interviews, a draft report has been produced by the European Parliament, specifically requesting the creation of an EU Climate Security Policy. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Draft Report on the Role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in the Case of Climate-driven Crises and Natural Disasters, 2012/2095(INI)*.

<sup>128</sup> Although as noted above, not yet launched at the time of interview.

<sup>129</sup> Personal communication, Spanish national official 1

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## **7.2 Cross-sectoral coordination**

One interviewee identified that a key priority for water and climate change issues was the need to go beyond the environmental sector. For measures on water management and climate change adaptation to be effective, mainstreaming their implementation in other sectors was seen to be necessary, most crucially in the sectors of agriculture, energy, transport, and regional planning. It was suggested by other interviewees that DG Environment and DG CLIMA produce easily understandable sectoral guidelines for other EU bodies to fully integrate water and climate adaptation concerns into their areas of work. This was seen to be potentially helpful – particularly in the case where policy makers are faced with scientific uncertainty – to understand the recommended course of action. In addition, one interviewee made that point that local stakeholder dialogue on implementation was the key to successful integration of water management and climate adaptation policy.<sup>130</sup> Further suggestions were that the Blueprint should seek to strengthen the link between policies for resource efficiency with the need to protect ecosystems for their resources and services to improve the impact and integration of water policy. The desire for better coordination between existing policy cycles (e.g. between drought and flood management) for greater efficiency and effectiveness at tackling cross-cutting challenges was also mentioned.

Many interviewees noted the need for policies and programming to address the long term impacts of climate change and its potential hazards. There was a tendency identified within the Commission to focus on projects of shorter-term urgency, avoiding more challenging and uncertain future problems. It was expected by several interviewees that improved communication, coordination and planning would help to move from simply responding to current crises. For those working on water issues, it was felt in particular that awareness of drought – a typically slower onset crisis - and implementation of measures to manage drought were in need of development across the EU.

## **7.3 Policy framing**

Another area identified for improvement was the framing of policy measures. Internally, the economy and jobs are high on the EUs current agenda. Highlighting linkages between climate adaptation and management of natural assets such as water, with the EUs economic value and growth, was recommended for increasing attention and support for these policies. From the point of view of a few interviewees, lessons should be learned from the way in which climate change mitigation has been approached, strengthening the link between science and policy and developing the economic dimension of policies such as the costs of water scarcity or floods for health care, or the

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<sup>130</sup> Personal communication, European Union official working on water issues

importance of flood and drought prevention not just for civil protection but also for avoiding unnecessary economic costs. A clear and targeted argument in this respect was viewed as being more helpful for gaining traction and support than ethical arguments for climate and environmental action.<sup>131</sup> With regards to policy action in areas of the Mediterranean where there has historically been a lack of cooperation, it was suggested to frame the issues in terms of technical cooperation e.g. mapping of aquifers, which can then act as a support once political decisions are being reached. However, the interviewee also noted that even technical cooperation could negatively impact the cooperation if, for example it were to reveal that a country was seriously disadvantaged in terms of water supply.

#### **7.4 Summary**

The pursuit of policies specifically addressing the interconnected elements of climate change impacts on the environment and thus on human security and conflict were not perceived to be in the pipeline nor likely to increase in importance in the near future. Interviewees' expectations and demands were rather wide ranging and mostly focused on how to improve the current policy framework rather than devising new policies or institutions. The need was perceived for greater integration of the issues of climate change adaptation and risks to human security with existing policies and issues that are currently high on the agenda such as the economy. Many interviewees perceived the need to share information and successful examples of how to implement climate change adaptation.

### **8. Evaluation of results**

Based on the policies examined and the interviewee opinions presented in the preceding chapters, the following section collects overall insights on the current policy framework and the insights on the future policy framework.

#### **8.1 *Insights on climate change, hydro-conflict and human security, and the current policy framework***

There is certainly an awareness among EU policy makers of the connections between climate change, water, human security and conflict. It was felt that on the ground, the EU is doing much to contribute to adapt to climate change and protect human security, although this may not always be explicit or readily identifiable. Whether the exclusion of explicit references to human security and conflict in water and climate change policy presents an obstacle for successfully addressing these issues is unclear (see Box 2). It was noted by many interviewees that the EU has policies which address aspects of the relationship between climate change adaptation and human security, but that these

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<sup>131</sup> Personal communication, European Union official working on environment and climate issues

might be labelled differently such as protection of ecosystem services and livelihoods. Policies for water, climate change, agriculture, or disaster risk reduction may address aspects of human security, when they take into account, for example, questions of vulnerability, protection of citizens or food security.

Nevertheless, the EU policy framework rarely deals with these issues in an interlinked – or in the case of human security, deliberate – manner, either in internal or in external policy. Several issues appear to be hampering the development of such a framework. Firstly, there is a lack of will or capacity to engage at an academic level on how to address conceptually complex issues, due to the fact that the much of the EUs policy work is focused on more specific, technical issues. The result of this is that although there may be activities which contribute implicitly to climate adaptation and water related impacts on human security and conflict, these are often not defined as such. In this way it may be unclear how these contribute to these policy agendas, either to officials and politicians working within the EU as well as to the external onlooker. To increase the clarity of these activities, Secondly, in addition to the complexity of the issues at hand, there is little agreement about which agency should take this coordination on. Thirdly, even as separate policy areas, there is a potential for politicisation of water, climate and human security policies as was seen in the otherwise technically sound Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean. If there are no adequate mechanisms for dealing with the political aspects of policy making, then even technical approaches can run into problems. Finally, there appears to be a reticence to take on the subject of human security in the first place, as it is seen in many ways to be a concept developed and led by the UN. Within the EU, despite initial enthusiasm for the issue of climate change and human security, political struggles between the Council and the Commission appear to have led to neither party wishing to champion these issues to take this agenda forward, although there appears to be a continuous interest at EP level to keep the issue on the agenda as illustrated in the draft report released in June 2012.

**Box 2: Definition and use of the human security concept**

All interviewees showed an awareness of EU activities that contributed in some respect to improving human security. The concept was generally understood in its broadest terms; as a way of emphasising individual wellbeing and security in contrast to traditional approaches to security which emphasise the role of the state. At the same time, interviewee interpretations of how the concept is operationalised within the EU policy framework ranged widely. This variability seems to be chiefly caused by the absence of a guiding EU level strategy or policies on human security either internally or externally.

While use of the term human security is neither consistent nor comprehensive, this

does not necessarily mean that human security is not addressed within EU policy. Rather, policy measures addressing human security concerns may do so under a different name. Indeed, policy measures addressing aspects of human security are common and it seems that the term is more at issue than the concept itself. For example, climate change adaptation and a focus on disaster and emergencies was mentioned as forming part of the EEAS' work in this respect, although this was not referenced as a human security activity per se. This point of view was corroborated by an interviewee from the EP who noted that although proposals which address the issue may be put forward in the EP, human security is addressed in a fragmented way across different instruments and labelled differently. They noted that this fragmentation could be a reason for the lack of uptake in the use of the concept.

Few people interviewed saw that there would be any added value of using human security as a framework or approach to combat this fragmentation. Furthermore the broad and sometimes ideological nature of concepts such as human security and climate change can mean that their use and application in the policy realm may be subject to political or pragmatic considerations. Firstly, certain countries may be sensitive to such issues because of the connotations that security may have within their domestic agenda (i.e. related to national security) and may thus appear to threaten their sovereignty. Secondly, an interviewee from DG Environment remarked that it was a more of a philosophical concept that was difficult to connect to policy making discussions which were based on more technical issues.

One interviewee did however find that human security can be a helpful lens for going beyond mere descriptive statements that link environment, security and development. From their point of view human security can be operationalised to examine overall effectiveness of EU policy in a number of interconnected areas. The concept of human security was also found to have been helpful in drawing attention to gaps between supporting state and security structures and classical development work at the community level, in understanding societal impacts of conflict and in developing accountability mechanisms.

## ***8.2 Insights for a future policy framework***

When evaluating the current policy framework and discussing future expectations and demands, interviewees tended to focus their expectations on major EU initiatives such as the White Paper, CLIMATE-ADAPT, the Blueprint, and the WFD rather than on the creation of new policies. Improved integration of current initiatives may hold greater promise in the immediate future as, despite various positioning documents, there appears to be little will or movement towards developing new policies to address the interlinkages between climate change and the impacts on water resources and human

security. There is nonetheless an awareness among EU policy-makers that beyond its own borders – within which internal stability, strong governance systems and legal frameworks are the norm – climate change impacts on water and the natural environment in general may create external human security and conflict risks which can have impacts on the EU. Indeed, even adaptation strategies to cope with risks such as migration may themselves bring new policy challenges to the EU where this migration is towards vulnerable areas such as coasts (threats to migrants) or indeed in the case of migrants crossing into the EU (pressures on services and threats to the EU citizens' social and economic security).

The Fitness Check of water policy and the resulting Blueprint may result in the identification and development of new water policies, but this process is still underway. However, as this process is not geared specifically towards improving human security or addressing conflict, it is unlikely that the outcomes will address the subject directly, although these issues may be indirectly integrated. The proposal for the earmarking of funds for climate change in the EU's budget for 2014-2020 (the Multiannual Financial Framework) was highlighted as showing the EU's interest and commitment to provide funding to tackle climate change, both mitigation and adaptation and as it applies to the entire budget, this will also mean greater consideration of climate change in development cooperation. Using human security as a lens could still provide a useful framework within which to situate climate change adaptation and water issues as well as the EU's work on rights-based approaches. However, as was mentioned by many interviewees, the EU's approach to human security has in any case tended towards implicit contributions to this agenda and although certain parts of the EP may be interested in this matter, this type of activity is unlikely to change unless there is a push from key actors within the Commission.

Should the EU choose to move the agenda of climate change, water/environment, human security and conflict forward, it will require cooperation and leadership between its institutions in order to develop an effective policy framework. It is not clear who should or would be willing to take charge of this. In general, human security was viewed by interviewees as an issue connected to external policies and as such, it would perhaps naturally be the EEAS who should tackle this coordination. However, the EEAS is still in an initial phase and has not yet been able to provide the necessary leadership. DG CLIMA could lead, but may need to improve its communication with and support to other EU institutions regarding how actions and policies to support climate change adaptation in connection to successful management of water resources and protection of human security should be implemented in practice. Whichever body is in charge of coordination for these issues, it is clear that communication will also be a vital aspect to ensure that their cross-cutting nature is considered in all relevant policy areas.

## 9. Conclusions

The EU's internal policy framework for addressing individual water and climate change issues was found by most interviewees to be a broadly effective basis for action. This framework has some clear limitations such as the need to consider over-delivery of water or to share an understanding of what is currently being done on climate adaptation and how to join up such efforts. However, these shortcomings were seen for the most part to be known to the Commission and were being tackled through policy development, consultations and review processes. Interviewees showed an awareness that the issues of climate change, water, human security and conflict are interconnected. Nevertheless, the issues of human security and conflict were not raised in the context of water and adaptation policy and there appeared to be little interest for including them as explicit concerns either in the policy review being carried out for the 'Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Waters' or as part of future climate change adaptation policy. This is likely due to the fact that human security and conflict were primarily viewed as 'external' policy areas to be dealt with under the umbrella of development cooperation or common foreign and security policy.

Those covering external policy issues in the Commission and at the EEAS noted that a number of activities may indirectly and implicitly contribute to positive outcomes for adaptation, human security and conflict, but that these were integrated into other policy areas rather than being dealt with as separate issues or indeed as an interconnected nexus. Indeed, the EU is beginning to implement policies in an increasingly cross-cutting way, as seen for example with the decision to mainstream climate change adaptation. Whilst this may be an effective and pragmatic approach, the lack of explicit policies which address adaptation to climate related impacts on water, human security and conflict in an interconnected way makes identifying activities which contribute to this agenda, and judging the effectiveness of such policies challenging, both for those looking in from the outside, as well as for those working within the EU system.

Although it has not been operationalised in an explicit way, a human security framework was highlighted by one interviewee as a potential tool or lens through which to bring policy making on adaptation to climate change together to address a broader range of interconnected issues. There has been some interest in the form of statements and positioning documents from the EP and the Council to explore the use of a human security framework. Yet, since the departure of Javier Solana as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the issue of human security and its links to other topics is much less visible. There appears to be little interest or political will from the Commission to take this forward as an interconnected issue, particularly in relation to internal policy and there is furthermore a lack of agreement and clarity on who has the competence for such issues as well as on the technicalities of how this could be

implemented. There appears to be an impression also that it is the UN rather than the EU that is currently driving debates of this nature forward through initiatives such as ENVSEC.

Nevertheless, recent activities on the side of the EP show that there continues to be interest in these issues with the release of the strategy for security in the Sahel<sup>132</sup> and the draft report compiled in June 2012 by the EPs Foreign Affairs Committee on Common Security and Defence Policy in the case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters.<sup>133</sup> The impact of these documents on the creation of an explicit policy framework that would bring together the links between human security, conflict, water and climate change is unclear and further interest and support from the Commission would be required for these initiatives to be taken forward. In the absence of explicit framework, there is in the very least a need for sound coordination within EU institutions and between thematic policy areas to ensure that the broad policy framework addressing water-related impacts of climate change is fully effective and to takes full consideration of the possible implications for human security and conflict.

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132 European Union External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel." 2011.

133 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Draft Report on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in the case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters 2012/2095(INI)

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## **Annex I – Glossary of institutions and instruments in EU policy-making**

### ***Institutions***

The **European Council** sets the EU's overall political direction and priorities, but has no powers to pass laws. It is led by its President and comprises national heads of state or government and the President of the Commission who meet in summits around 4 times a year.

There are three main institutions involved in the EU legislative process:

The **European Parliament** (EP) consists of directly elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who represent European citizens. As with national parliaments, MEPs also participate in various committees which focus on particular issues such as international development (DEVE Committee) or environment (ENVI Committee). These committees also receive support through the Parliament secretariat and its Directorates-General (DGs) (not to be confused with the DGs of the Commission). The EP can raise attention and awareness of issues, but requires the Commission to develop a proposal concerning the technicalities of how these issues should be addressed.

The **Council of the European Union** (usually referred to as ‘The Council’) represents the governments of the individual member countries. The Presidency of the Council is shared by the member states on a rotating basis.

The **European Commission** represents and upholds the interests of the EU as a whole. 27 Commissioners, one from each EU country is assigned responsibility for specific policy areas by the President for a five year term. The day-to-day running of the Commission is taken care of by the Commission’s staff organised in departments known as Directorates-General (DGs) which include a DG Climate Action, DG Development Cooperation Europe Aid and DG Environment. The Commission oversees and implements EU policies by:

- proposing new laws to Parliament and the Council on issues that cannot be dealt with effectively at national, regional or local level. The Council and Parliament are then responsible for deciding whether to adopt these proposals as laws.
- managing the EU's budget and allocating funding. It sets long term spending priorities in the EU ‘financial framework’ and manages funding for EU policies such as agriculture and rural development.
- enforcing EU law (together with the Court of Justice)
- representing the EU internationally, for example, by negotiating agreements between the EU and other countries

Key DGs of interest for this study include (but are not limited to):

The **Directorate General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA)** leads international negotiations on climate, helps the EU to deal with the consequences of climate change and to meet its targets for 2020 and develops and implements the EU Emissions Trading System.

**DG DEVCO – EuropeAid Development and Cooperation** is responsible for designing European development policy and delivering aid throughout the world through a set of financial instruments. DG DEVCO promotes good governance, human and economic development and tackles universal issues, such as fighting hunger and preserving natural resources.

The objective of the **Directorate-General for Environment (DG ENV)** is to protect, preserve and improve the environment for present and future generations. To achieve this it proposes policies that ensure a high level of environmental protection in the European Union and that preserve the quality of life of EU citizens.

**DG HOME – Directorate-General for Home Affairs** aims to ensure that all activities necessary and beneficial to the economic, cultural and social growth of the EU may develop in a stable, lawful and secure environment. This includes strengthening cooperation on law enforcement, border management, civil protection and disaster management.

In addition to the three main institutions involved in legislative work of the EU, certain additional bodies have specialised roles to play, one of which is the **European External Action Service (EEAS)**. The EEAS was established in January 2011 which assists the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and conducts the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), also ensuring the consistency and coordination of the EU's external action.

The EU has a number of decentralised agencies and bodies, established to support the EU Member States and their citizens with new tasks of a legal, technical and/or scientific nature. Included in this is the **European Environment Agency (EEA)** which provides independent information on the environment to feed into EU and national policymaking. The EEA also coordinates European topic centres to collect, manage and analyse data on specific areas, including water.

### ***Instruments***

The EU member countries have transferred some of their law-making authority to the EU in certain policy areas, such as agriculture and fisheries. In other areas, such as culture, policy-making is shared between the EU and national governments. The

Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and applicant countries have to accept the Community acquis before they can join the Union.

A **Commission Communication** is a policy document which sets out its own thinking on a topical issue. It has no mandatory authority or legal effect.

A **Recommendation** is a legal instrument that enables the Commission (or the Council) encourages those to whom it is addressed to act in a particular way but is non-binding.

**Regulations** are the most direct form of EU law - as soon as they are passed, they have binding legal force throughout every Member State, on a par with national laws. National governments do not have to take action themselves to implement EU regulations.

**EU directives** lay down certain end results that must be achieved in every Member State. Although national authorities must adapt their laws to meet these goals, they are free to decide how this should be done.

**Decisions** are EU laws relating to specific cases and are addressed to specific parties. They are fully binding and can come from the EU Council (sometimes jointly with the European Parliament) or the Commission. They can require authorities and individuals in Member States either to do something or stop doing something, and can also confer rights on them.

Commission **White Paper** contains proposals for Community action in a specific area. In some cases they follow a **Green Paper** published to launch a consultation process at European level. When a White Paper is favourably received by the Council, it can lead to an action programme for the Union in the area concerned.

### **Sources (all accessed 30 July 2012)**

[http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm)

[http://ec.europa.eu/eu\\_law/introduction/what\\_directive\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm)

[http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/glossary/glossary\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/glossary/glossary_en.htm)

[http://europa.eu/scadplus/aboutglossary\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/aboutglossary_en.htm)

<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs>

## Annex II – Insights from the Member State level

EU policy is both driven by and implemented by its Member States. Spain, as an EU Member State located within the MMES region was selected to provide a counter-balance to the points of view of EU level policymakers. On the basis of desk-based research and interviews with two civil servants, this section provides a brief insight into the how climate change, hydro-conflict and human security are perceived and addressed in Spain through both the EU and national policy framework.<sup>134</sup>

Spain is one of the only EU MS with a system for gathering data on the current situation of national **water** resources to produce maps for public awareness and to provide information to water managers. Although at EU level interviewees stated the need to further develop drought management policy, some Member States, such as Spain, are already working substantially on drought management. Spain has developed its own Special Plans on Droughts (Planes especiales de sequía) which aim to provide a flexible mechanism to manage drought situations. The Spanish system uses monthly maps to show the drought and water scarcity situation across the country and depending on the water situation (normal, alert or emergency) determines the measures necessary. These can range from water transfers in the most extreme situations or longer-term management measures which are implemented even in a non-drought situation.

Spain is also developing its modelling and risk review capacities to improve understanding of the future impacts of the water situation. In general, the Spanish interviewees felt that current policies and tools available for water management were good. At EU level in contrast, it was highlighted by one interviewee that consideration for drought was more recent and that thus far, the EU strategy for managing drought has not been as well promoted as the Floods Directive and the WFD.<sup>135</sup> The interviewee remarked that the current framework at EU level is very broad and that MS are awaiting the Commission's proposals for concrete measures under the Blueprint. She hoped that due to the future impacts on all EU citizens in the long run, more emphasis would be placed on tackling drought in the future.

The Spanish government is working to bring **climate change adaptation** into its water policies and is starting a process of review to bring a more adaptive approach to the special plans on drought and how to bring non-conventional water sources such as water reuse into the plans. One interviewee noted that mainstreaming climate change

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<sup>134</sup> For further information on Spain's Special Drought Plans and other policies of relevance, see the CLICO document: Schwörer, S., (2011) Assessment of Spanish climate adaptation and water policies.

<sup>135</sup> Personal communication, Spanish national official 2.

concerns in water policy was one of the main issues that the Commission must tackle but that how exactly this should be done was as yet unresolved.<sup>136</sup> The other interviewee commented that although there are studies on the effects of climate change, it is not clear if these are having an effective impact on policies being developed at EU level.<sup>137</sup> Both interviewees mentioned the need for sharing lessons learned regarding climate change adaptation between MS as a way of assisting with implementation of measures across the EU.

The Spanish Ministry of Defence together with the EU funded a report on climate change and global security in 2010, which claims that water scarcity will provoke conflicts in relation to agriculture, will have impacts on human health and will cause migration which will result in conflict due to the shock effect they will have on resource distribution.<sup>138</sup> The overall competency for the broad issues connected to **human security** i.e. civil protection is concentrated in the ministry of internal affairs. Food security is dealt with in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment, but not in the work of the water department. However, as yet, Spain has not developed a cross-cutting strategy for dealing with the full range of water related impacts of climate change on human security and/or conflict. One interviewee supported increased planning to move beyond 'daily routines' as little is being done in policy terms to cope with the indirect impacts of water scarcity, including on human security.<sup>139</sup> Nevertheless, the other interviewee felt that more work was needed to first understand the direct impacts to be able to work with future situations and any wider implications.<sup>140</sup>

One interviewee noted that Spain has considerable experience of dealing with conflict over water, and cited the ancient Tribunal de las aguas (Water court) in Valencia which meets in public on a weekly basis to resolve water disputes.<sup>141</sup> However, the interviewee remarked that if drought increases, problems may arise when dealing with actual water demand. Water management policy varies over time according to different governments but when centralised inter-basin water transfers are favoured, those from one river basin are often uncomfortable with sending water to another region.<sup>142</sup> The interviewee did not see the potential for large conflicts in the future as Spain already has a long experience of dealing with drought and in addition has diversified to increase waste water reuse and desalination.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless, she was aware that in the future, droughts

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136 Personal communication, Spanish national official 1

137 Personal communication, Spanish national official 2

138 CITpax, Cambio Climático y Seguridad Global, Documento CITpax nº 12. October 2010.

139 Personal communication, Spanish national official 2

140 Personal communication Spanish national official 1

141 Personal communication, Spanish national official 2

142 For more details of these conflicts see e.g. Lopez-Gunn, E. 2009

143 Personal communication, Spanish national official 2

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would be very heavy and severe and that in the long term there may be a need to make alternative arrangements in terms of water transfers.

The other interviewee noted that it would be interesting to find common ways of working together on to improve cooperation and reduce conflict in water management at a European level.<sup>144</sup> He felt that at the national level, good coordination of the central government is quite important but that European coordination would also help to resolve situations where there is insufficient capacity to respond to the needs of the whole country at any given moment. The best idea, this interviewee felt, was to share experiences within Europe. The EU could find the best way forward in relation to water issues and could produce a document to highlight the strengths of different Member States in water management.

The Spanish example detailed here demonstrates one way in which water policy has been interpreted in a MS and highlights that there are a number of policy tools available for addressing water issues arising from climate change (e.g. desalination, water re-use and inter-basin transfers). Each MS will adapt to climate change impacts on water by choosing different instruments according to their individual water resources and situation. Both interviewees specifically highlighted the importance of coordination and knowledge sharing within the EU on climate change adaptation in relation to water. It is a positive sign therefore that the EU is now facilitating this through the European Climate Change Adaptation Platform (CLIMATE-ADAPT). The Spanish example verifies the need for better drought management within the EU but also demonstrates how individual MS can take action that goes beyond EU policy where this is deemed necessary, as illustrated in their Drought Management Plans.

*The views expressed in this study are those of the interviewees and do not necessarily reflect those of the Spanish government.*

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<sup>144</sup> Personal communication, Spanish national official 1

## **Annex III – List of interviewees**

### **European Union**

Efstathios Dalamangas: DG Development Cooperation, EU Commission

Henriette Faergemanns: DG Environment, EU Commission

Carlos Illan: DEVE Committee Secretariat, European Parliament

Andre Jol: European Environment Agency

Maria C. C. Munoz: European External Action Service

Andrew Murphy: DG Environment, EU Commission

Michail Papdoyannakis: DG Environment, EU Commission

Gerard Quille: DG External Policies, European Parliament

Hans Stielstra: DG Environment, EU Commission

Jannick Vaa: DG Development Cooperation, EU Commission

Beate Werner: European Environment Agency

Sami Zeidan: DG Clima, EU Commission

Matthais Zoellner: European Investment Bank

### **Spain**

Two officials working on water policy in Spain (anonymous)